Let\u27s Be Frank: Are the Proposed US Rules Based on Basel III An Adequate Response to the Financial Debacle? by Goyfman, Eugene
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 36, Issue 4 2013 Article 6
Let’s Be Frank: Are the Proposed US Rules
Based on Basel III An Adequate Response to
the Financial Debacle?
Eugene Goyfman∗
∗Fordham University School of Law
Copyright c©2013 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
COMMENT
LET'S BE FRANK: ARE THE PROPOSED US
RULES BASED ON BASEL III AN ADEQUATE
RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL DEBACLE?
Eugene Goyfnan*
INTRODUCTION. .................................. 1062
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THREE BASEL
A. Basel I ............................ ........ 1068
B . B asel II .............................. ..............1075
C . B asel III ...........................................1080
II. BASEL III V. US PROPOSED RULES ................ 1083
A. Tier 1 Common Equity ............................................... 1084
B. Additional Tier 1 Capital ............................................ 1085
C. Total Capital Ratio ....................... 1086
D. Conservation Buffer.................................................... 1087
E. Counter Cyclical Buffer............................................... 1089
F. Prompt Corrective Action ................ ..... 1092
G. Transitional Differences in Phasing Requirements .. 1094
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW REQUIREMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 1096
A. The United States Does Not Always Enforce Its
Bank Capital Requirements.................... 1098
B. Banks Have Accumulated a Key Capital
Component in Excess of the Requirements............. 1100
C. The Minimum Requirements Should Be Set to
Those Levels Which Bolster Bank Confidence........1102
CONCLUSIO N .......................................................................... 1105
INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, September 13, 2008, Jamie Dimon, then CEO
of JP Morgan Chase, declared, "We just hit the iceberg. The
1062
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boat is filling with water, and the music is still playing. There
aren't enough lifeboats. Someone is going to die." I On
September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers filed the largest US
bankruptcy filing ever." The financial ramifications were quick
and merciless-two weeks later, Washington Mutual failed and
became the largest bank in US history to collapse from a bank
run. The panic causing the bank run was not solely a US
problem.4 Just a year earlier, Northern Rock Plc, a UK bank,
suffered from the country's first bank run in 140 years.5 The
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1. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMLS KwAK, 13 BANKERS: THE NVALL STREET T.AKLOVLR AND
THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 162 (2012).
2. See Sam Mamudi, Lehman Folds with Record $613 Billion Debt. MARKETWATCH
(Sept. 15 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/Stoly/story/printkguid=2FE5A(05-
597A-4E71-A2D5-9B9FCC29052 (noting that the Lehman bankruptcy was the largest
one ever filed in United States' history); Jonathan Stempel, Factbox: Largest US
Bankruptcies, REUTERS (Oct. 31. 2011), http://www,.rcuters.com/article/2011/10/31/
us-mfglobal-bankruptcies-idUSTRE79U4520111031 (listing the largest US
bankruptcies, starting with Lehman Brothers).
3. See Cyrus Sanati, Behind the Downfall of Washington Mutual N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2009, http://dealbook.lnytines.con/2009/10/29/behind-the-dowvnfall-of-washington-
mutual (explaining how a series of bank runs lkd to the bank's failure); Robin Sidel,
David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick, Wamu is Seized, Sold OfftoJ.P. Aforgan, in Largest Failure
in U.S. Banking Histoy, WAIL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008,
http://online.wsj.cotom/article/SB122238415586576687.htmil (discussing the failure of
the bank). Depositors have a right to withdraw their money on demand. Banks only
keep a small amount of the cash for deposits on demand. Therefore, if the bank's
depositors all withdraw at the same tiie, the bank will have no cash to meet its
immediate expenses and pay its depositors. The bank thus becomes insolvent due to a
bank run. See PICRD C1AR LWNFI [Th[.,.jONArAN MACEY & GFOTRFY MTLERR, RF-E LAW,' OT
BANKI17NG AND FINANCTAT. INSTPTUTIONTS 58-59 (4th ed. 4009) (explaining how bankl..
runs can cause bank failure and emnphasizing 1141 " withou emrIncy assistanceIC C...
no bank . . ca-, ihstand a persistent run").
4. See Brooke Masters, Northern Rock Exposed Regulato Failings, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2012. http://wwW.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7bblabla-fcO0-1lc-af33-
00144feabdcO.htm (explaining how Northern Rock failed due to a bank run and in
part because the bank had "very littlc equity to absorb unexpected losses"); Northern
Rock, Lessons of the Fall. ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.conomit.com/node/
9988865 (noting that this was "Britain's first bank run in 140 years").
5. See Mastcrs, supra note 4 (explaining that Northern Rock was the first bank run
in 140 ears): Daniel Bentley, Northern Rock Bank Run Could Have Been Avoided, Says
Hector Sants, IN)EPENDENT, June 13, 2012, http://www.independent.co.uk/newvs/
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failure of Northern Rock, Washington Mutual and the hundreds
of banks that failed after them illustrate the importance of
safeguarding depositors from the adverse effects of losses.
Imposing minimum capital regulations is one such way
regulators protect their depositors.7
Capital has many meanings. 8 For the purposes of this
Comment, "regulatory capital" is the most relevant.9 As long as
banks have capital that is equivalent to, or more than the value
of incurred losses, the depositors will be protected. 1o For
example, if a bank has US$1,000 of loans funded by US$800 in
deposits and US$200 in common stock, the US$200 common
business/ news/ northern-rock-bank-ri In-couId-have-been-a-voided-says-hector-sants-
7847503.htmi (reporting on ways the bank could have avoided a run).
6. See Bank Failures in Brief 2009, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (2013),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/bank/2009/ [hereinafter Bank Failure Report
2009] (listing the bank which failed in 2009). For example in 2009 alone, bank failures
ranged from large banks such as Colonial Bank in Alabama, with about US$25 billion in
assets. to small banks such as the Dwelling House Savings and Loan Association. in
Pennsylvania. with about USS13 million in assets. See id.; see also Pallavi Gogoi. A Year
After Lehman's Collapse, Bank Industry is on New Path, USA TODAY, Sept. 15, 2009
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/'year-lhimans-collapse-bank-industry-path/story?id=
8564287#.UN-SAY4ur (noting that "9 smale banks have faile d fhis year [2009],
compa with 25 last year [2008]. More aiures loom as the government's list of
p e bn tops 400 ")
7, See (ARNELL, MACEY & MILLER. su/Ira nOt e, al 277 (explaining that capital
helps protect depositors and debt holderi because L[a]s long as the institution's assets
can be sold for morc thIic the mounil needed W sainsfy the institution's liabilities, the
ilstitiuion's creditors should incur no loss" and niing h.i "[dlbIholders arc
protected h the 'equity cuihion' tiat must be exhauted before the lirm's losses eat
into their principal") John H. Cochraine. The More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank,
WVALL ST. J.. July 15, 2011. hitp:oninews].com/a41cleSB100014240527028049
11104576444482440753 1 3c .bti-I (discussing how higher levels of bank capital means
less chanleX that a bank be una-dblc lo p)y its c(ediors and flil).
8. See RICILAID (ARNLLL jONAIILN M CEY & GEOFFRLY MILLER, THE LAW ()F
IBANTNG AND FTNANCIAL INSTTONS 40c-03 (5th ed. forthcoming) [hereinafter
CARNET[] (discussing several meanngs in dilerent financial contexts); BiLACK'S LAW
DICTIO)NARY 236 (9th ed. 2009) (listing five different meanings of capital).
9. See CARNELI., supra note 8, at 402-03 (explaining that capital is the amount the
assets exceed liabilities); FFD. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, BASICS FOR BANK
DIRECTORS 25 (5th ed. 2010) (explaining that regulatory capital is the specific capital
articulated by "[r]egulatory guidelines define capital and spell out the minimum
acceptable capital lcycls for banks. The purpose of these guidelines is to protect
depositors and the federal deposit insurance fund").
10. See CARNELL, supra note 8, at 402 (explaining that depositors are protected
when bank capital exceeds a bank's losses); DOUGLLA SJ. ELLIOT, BROOKINGS INST., A
PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL 1 (2010) [hereinafter ELLIOT, CAPITAL PRIMER] (asserting
that "there are strong policy reasons to protect depositors").
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stock will protect the depositors should some portion of the
loans not get repaid." Given the importance of preventing
depositors from causing bank runs and consequent bank failure,
bank capital regulations aim to reduce risks to depositors
through a framework that focuses on minimum bank capital
standards. 1
In the United States, capital standards work in tandem with
the prompt corrective action ("PCA") framework established by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 ("FDICIA").'s The FDICIA emphasizes capital supervision
as the primary tool for regulation. 14 The FDICIA requires
prompt corrective action, including requiring increased capital
standards for certain financial institutions, like banks, if a lack of
capital adequacy make a financial institution unsafe or
unsound. 1
Since the late 1980s, an international body of banking
regulators known as the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision ("BCBS"), have developed, inter alia, minimum
11. See li10T, CAPITAL PRIMER, supra note 10, at I (providing a similar example);
Cochrane, supra note 7 (explaining samc).
12. See CARNELL, supra note 8, at 401 (noting that the regulators' oversight of the
safety and soundness" of banks -center[s]" on capital); ET.iOT, CAPTTAl. PRIMER,
supra note 10, at 5-6 (explaining that regulatiois focus on bank capital in order to
protect depositors).
13. See 12 U.S.C. 1831o (2006) (authorizing federal banking agencies to take
prompt L corrective action" to ensure that banks maintain the inininuim capital
requirements mandated by the agencies): CARNLLL, supra not 8, at 403 (discussing the
statutory origin for regulatory authority).
14. See 12 C.F.R. § 325.101 (2012) ("Section 38 of the [Federal Deposit Insurance
Act] FDI Act establishes a framework of supervisoly actions for insured depository
institutions that are not adequately capitalized. The principal purpose of this subpart is
to define. for [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] FDIC-insured state-chartcred
nonmember banks, the capital incasures and capital lkvels. and for insured branches of
foreign banks, comparable asset-based measures and levels, that are used for
determining the supervisoly actions authorized under section 38 of the FDI Act.");
MICHALL P. MALLOY, REGULIATION BY THL BANKING RLGULATORY AGENCILS, BANKING
LAW & REG. 7.03 [C] [4] (b) (2012) (explaining that the Basel Accords focus on
capital requirements).
15. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (g) (2006) ("If the appropriate Federal banking agency
determines . . . [that] the institution is undercapitalized, [it may] take any I or more
actions authorized under subsection (f) (2) of this section ... [including requiring an
institution to] specify the steps [hat e insured depository institution will Lake to
correct the unsafe or unsound condition or practice.").
2013] 106'
1066 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1062
global bank capital standards.l6 The international agreements,
known as the Basel Accords, are non-binding on committee
member committee members, which currently represent twenty-
seven countries. 7 Since 1998 the Basel Committee has published
three accords: Basel I, finalized in 1988, Basel II finalized in
2004, and Basel III finalized in 2010.8 The Basel agreements'
focus on capital requirements is founded on the idea that
mandating banks to have high quality capital will protect the
depositors from losses.19
The three current main federal bank regulators in the
United States, the Federal Reserve Board ("Federal Reserve"),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
(collectively, "US agencies"), all hold seats on the BCBS and are
responsible for implementing the agreements reached by the
16. See About the Basel Committee., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS (Jan. 23 2013),
http:,//vw.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (discussing the main functions of the Basel
committee); Jim Brunsden, Basel Bank Group Attacks EL 0S for Capital Rules Lapses,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWLLK (Oct. 1 2012), http://ww.businessweek.coi/news/2012-
10-01/basel-bank-group-attacks-eu-u-dot-s-dot-for-capital-ruIles-lapses (noting the
BCBS's rolk in establishing international capital requirements).
17. See BASEL (OMMI. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAI MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAI STANDARDS [ 2 (1988) [hereinafter BASEL 1],
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf (explaining that the respective
regulatory authority of each nation is responsible for implementing the Basel
standards); CARNET.I, spra note 8, at 404 (discussing the development of Basel 1);
History of the Basel Committee and its Mem-berhip, BANK FOR INT'L SETITEMENTS,
http: /ww. bis.org/ bcbs/hitory.htmill ("The Committee's members come from
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong
SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Arica, Spain, Sweden. Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States.") (last visited May 31, 2013).
18. See generally BASELI 1, supra note 17; BASEI COiM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A
REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004) [hereinafter BASET. II], available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsl28.pdf; BANK FOR INTI SETTIEMENTS BASEI COIM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION: BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT
BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS, (2010) [hereinafter BASEL III], available at
http://w .bis.org/publ/bchsbl89.pdf.
19. See CARNLLL, supra not 8, at 402 (" [W]ell capitalized banks are lss likely to
falter or fail than poorly capitalized banks. Thus capital requirements help protect
depositors, other creditors. the FDIC, and the financial system."); ELLIOT, CAPITAL
PRIMER, supra note 10, at 2 ("[C]apital is intended to protect certain parties from
losses, including depositors, bank customers, and bank counterparties.").
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committee in the US.20 The regulators decide how to implement
the capital standards promulgated by the Basel Accords. 21
Specifically, the US agencies draft bank regulations they deem
necessary pursuant to authority granted by Congress.2
Part I of this Comment briefly reviews the most crucial
aspects of the three international banking standards and
discusses some of their perceived flaws. Part 11 reviews the US
proposed rules and compares them to the newest accord (Basel
III). Part III analyzes the proposed rules in the context of the
previous accords and current bank capital ratios. It argues that
the newest Accord suffers from some of the same historical flaws
as the previous accords and that the proposed rules should
require much higher capital ratios, as evidenced by empirical
studies measuring current bank capital levels showing that bank
capital levels currently surpass the mandatory requirements.
20. See 12 U.S.C. 3911(a) (2012) ("[T]he Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation shall be given equal representation wvith the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Systern and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the
Conmittee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices of the Group of Ten
Countries and Switzerland."); Brunsden, supra note 16 ("US. i-egulatoi-s represented
on tl BaselJ conunitte in hcude 1 FAeeral R the Office of tl Comptrllr of
thiCnecy and the F-eeral Deposit, hIur~ance Corp.",.
21. See 12 U.S.C. 3907(a) (2) (2012) ("Each appropriate Federal banking agency
shall have the authority to establish such minimum level of capital for a banking
institution as the appropriate Federal banking agency, in its discretion, deeins to be
necessary or appropriate in light of the particular circumstances of the banking
institution.") (tmphasis added); Jeroine Walker t al., Reconciling the Dodd-Frank and
Basel Committee Capital Requirement, 129 BANKING L.J. 627, 642-43 (2012) ("The Basel
Committee essentially makes recommendations that each country is free to adopt or
not adopt. While the Basel capital requirements are intended to assure international
consistency, different countries have adopted different versions of the Basel capital
requirements and, thus, different Basel requirements apply to different financial
institutions."). The Office of Thrift Supervision, a fourth banking agency, was
abolished by the Dodd-Frank Act and places its regulatory authority in the other
regulators. See 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b) (1) (B) (2012) (transferring and vesting the powers
of the OTS to the remaining agencies, the Federal Reserve and the OCC).
22. See 12 U.S.C. 3907(a) (2), supra note 21 (granting statutory discretion to
regulators to establish minimum capital requirements); see, e.g., Risk-1Based Capital
Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Standardized Framework, 73 Fed. Reg.
43982, 43984 (proposed July 29. 2008) (noting that parts of Basel I were implemented
into US regulations).
2013] 1067
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1. THE DEVTLOPMENT OF THE THREE BASEL ACCORDS
This Part reviews the historical development of the first two
Basel Accords, and discusses the main new provisions the newest
Accord (Basel 111). It also details how the United States has
implemented the first two international agreements. The part
also lays out the main criticisms of each Accord.
A. Basel I
The First Basel Agreement introduced risk based capital
standards and took effect at the end of 1992.2 The innovation of
the agreement was that it established minimum capital standards
across banks on an international level.24 It provided that the
minimum bank capital ratio for regulatory purposes should be
calculated by dividing the bank's regulatory capital (numerator)
by the bani's risk-weighted assets (denominator). The risk
weighing system was based on Basel I's focus on credit risk-the
risk that a counterparty might default on his obligation to
repay. 2 The agreement introduced five risk-weight categories
for the assets denominator of the capital assets ratio, ranging
from 0% for assets such as cash or bonds from the central banks
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
23. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 11 44-46 (stating that banks had until the end of
1992 to reach the target ratio); Malloy, supra note 14, at [4] (b) (2013) (discussing the
historical background regarding the introduction of capital standards via Basel 1).
24. See 1ASEL I, supra note 17, 11 1, 7, 10 (noting that the Committee wishes "to
ensure that the integrity of the capital of banks is maintained"); Id. 1 12 (noting the
importance "thc Committee attaches to securing a progressive enhancement in the
quality, as well as the level, of the total capital resources maintained by major banks");
Heath Price Tarbert, Rehinkin Capital Adequacy: The Basel Accord and the New
Framework, 56 BLs. L. 767, 779-80 (2001) (noting that the Basel Committee introduced
the concept of "regulatory" capital); Basel Accord, FIN. TIMES LEXICON,
http://lexiconi.ft.com/Termterm =1asel-Accord (noting that the first accord on
"banking supeivision rules ... agreed upon by the G10 major western economics ...
was reached in 1988").
25. See 12 U.S.C. 5371 (a) (2) (b) (defining the capital ratio as "regulatory capital
components in the numerator ... the risk-weighted assets in the denominator ... and
the required ratio of the numerator to the denominator"); CARNELL, supra note 8, at
413 (explaining how to calculate the total capital ratio). The United States has adopted
this ratio.
26. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 1 8 ("The framework in this document is mainly
directed towards assessing capital in relation to credit risk (the risk of counterparty
failure) .... ); Id. 1 31 ("For most banks the major risk is credit risk,... the risk of
counterparty failure.").
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Development ("OECD"), to 100% for assets obtained from
private transactions.27By standardizing the relative risk weights
of assets across nations, banks, which carry different types of
assets, would be able to rely on uniform general rules to
calculate their capital requirements.28
For example, assume Bank A has US$50 each in bonds
from the German and French central banks. Further assume
that the yield on the bonds was substantially different, such as
3.5% and 4 .5 % for the German and French bonds, respectively.
Without an international standard, the local bank may place
more weight on the riskier French bonds. Under Basel I,
however, both assets are claims on OECD central banks, and get
weighed equally (i.e., 0%).29 No additional capital is necessary to
act as a buffer for unexpected losses because the expected loss is
a loss of zero.30 Basel I assumed that the OECD banks are
relatively safe and have a low risk of counterparty default.'
Consequently, it simplified the way banks calculated their
required capital, permitting them to ignore idiosyncratic market
27. See id. 1 29 (listing the risk weights); id. Annex 2 (delineating the risk weights
for different types of assets). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development ("OECD") is a group of countries, mostly including European and North
American countries, committed to increasing economic progress and world trade. See
About the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http:/vw,/ l.OECD.org/about
(last visited May 31, 2013).
28. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 1 28(i) (stating that the risk weights "provides a
faircr basis for making international comparisons between banking systems whose
structures may differ").
29. See id 36 (assigning a zero percent risk weight to claims on OFCl) "central
governments and central banks outside the OECD").
30. See id. 1 33 (explaining that the Committee chose to implement a risk
weighing system that involved defining a "grouping of countries considered to be of
high credit standing"). Basel I defines credit risk, and thus assigns risk weights, based
on the risk that a countelrparty fails to fulfill his obligation; a risk weight of zero
necessarily implies that the Basel Committee expects a counter party will not fail to pay
his obligations. See supra note 26 and accompan)ying text (explaining that Basel I
focuses on countelrparty risk).
31. See supra note 29 (explaining that Basel thought the OECD countries were of
high credit standing); see also BASLL I, supra note 17, 1 36 (explaining that claims on
OECD government will "attract a zero weight" and that even claims on certain central
banks outside the OECD will "also attract a zero weight ... [because this] relects the
absence of risks relating to the availability and transfer of foreign exchange on such
claims"); TarberL, supra note 24, at 793 (explaining that under Basel 1, "loans to OECD
national governments are uniformly assessed as presenting no risk of default").
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differences such as yields on similarly risky French and German
bonds.,2
Basel I divided the regulatory capital (numerator) into two
tiers: core capital, or Tier 1 Capital, and supplementary, or Tier
2 Capital.3 Like all the Basel agreements, it provided that Tier 1
Capital should be composed of high quality capital like common
stock, while Tier 2 Capital should include less absorbent capital,
such as subordinated term debt. 4 The numerator of the ratio
included Tier 1 Capital and Tier 2 Capital.3 5 The first agreement
required an overall minimum capital ratio of 8%, including a
minimum 4% Tier 1 ratio.
Before discussing the details of Basel I's distinction between
tiers of capital, a numerical example may elucidate how capital
absorption works. Figure 1 illustrates that on any balance sheet,
assets must be equal to liabilities plus equity.3Assume that Bank
A has US$1000 in loans, US$900 in deposits, and US$100 in
common equity. As Figure 2 illustrates, if US$150 worth of loans
default, Bank A now has the following balance sheet structure:
USS850 (assets) = USS900 (liabilities) + (-US$50) (equity). 8 The
bank's equity failed to cover the losses it incurred. Therefore it
has US$850 in assets to meet its US$900 obligation, and the
ability of depositors to recover is at risk."
32. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 1 36 (assigning the sane risk weight based on
incinbership to the OECD).
33. See id. 1 14 (defining and separating capital into two tiers).
34. See id. 12 n.2 (using the term equity capital to elaborate on Tier I Capital).
The agreement defines equity capital as "ordinary shares/common stock and non-
cumulative preferred stock." Id.: BASEL 1, supra note 17, 1 23 (claborating on Tier 2
Capital by explaining that subordinated term debt has "deiiciencies" in its ability "to
absorb losses[,] except in a liquidation").
35. See id. Annex IA ("The sum of tier 1 and tier 2 clements will be eligible for
inclusion in the capital base . . .
36. See id. 1 44 (establishing that "the target standard ratio of capital to weighted
risk assets should be set at 8% (of which the core capital clement will be at icast 4%)").
37. Figures 1-2 and the following example are heavily based on the award-
winning essay, "Rethinking Capital Adequacy: The Basel Accord and the New
Framework." See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 785 (explaining how capital losses are
reflected on a bank's balance sheet); CARNELL, supra note 8, at 402-03 (explaining that
capital is the amount the assets exceed liabilities).
38. SeeTarbert, supra note 24, at 771 (providing a similar examplc).
39. See id. at 772 (" [T]he bank now has the possibility of recovering only
[US]$85,000,000. but its obligations remain [US]$90.000,000."): CARNLLL, supra not
8, at 402 (explaining that a bank with iore capitali is more likely to protect depositors
from losses).
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Figure 1 - Before a Loss of 15%
$1000 (Loans) $900 (Deposits) $100 (Common Stock)
CAPITAL RATIO =
100/1000 = 10% Tier 1
Equity.
Figure 2 - After a Loss of 15%
ANNETS= I 1A IlillE 1FS + SHARI llOI 1)ER-J
$850 (Loans) $900 (Deposits) ($50) (Common Stock)
CAPITAL RATIO = 0
Accordingly, the distinction between Tier 1 and Tier 2
Capital reflects the Basel Accords' fundamental theory of
depositor protection. 40 Tier 1 Capital is supposed to be the most
loss absorbing capital. 4 1 This means that, as a bank incurs losses,
it can deplete common equity to cover the losses it incurs by
selling or issuing more shares.4 2 Because a bank's own common
40. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing how Basel I focuses
on capital requirements); supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (explaining how
increased levels of capital protects depositors).
41. See Thomas Hucrtas, Dir., Banking Sector, Address at the Fin. Scry. Auth. City
& Fin. Bank Capital Seminar (Junc 26, 2008), transcript available at
http://www.fsa.gov.tuk/library/communication/speeches/2008/0626_th.shtml
(explaining that "[s]hareholder's equity certainly absorbs losses; indeed it bears first
loss"); see also BASEL I, supra note 17, 12, 23 (explaining that "the key clement of
capital on which the main emphasis should be placed is equity capital," while
subordinated dcbt offers less protection due to its "inability to absorb losses").
42. See CARNELL stpra note 8, at 407 (explaining that common equity shares have
"no special rights[,]" bear the risk of loss, and have the lowest claim in a liquidation);
Huertas, supra note 41 ("Tier I capital should be capital that is available to absorb
losses on a "going-concern" basis, or capital that can be depleted without placing the
bank into insolvency, administration or liquidation.").
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equity (i.e., its shareholder's equity) imposes no payment
obligation on a bank, its outstanding equity can cover the loss4.?
Conversely, Tier 2 Capital does impose some obligations on
banks. 44 For example, banks must make interest payments on
their subordinated debt.45 Tier 2 Capital can only include debt
that is "subordinated," or junior, to claims by depositors.46 This
means that if a bank loses all its Tier 1 Capital and is forced to
liquidate its assets, depositor claimants get paid before
subordinated debt holders.47 Therefore, Tier 2 Capital provides
protection for depositors once a bank is unable to make
payments to creditors, while Tier 1 Capital provides protection
for depositors and ensures banks can pay their creditors. 8
Basel I established a target ratio requirement of 8%
between capital and risk weighted assets . This means that the
ratio between the numerator (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 Capital) divided
by the denominator (risk-weighted adjusted assets) must equal
43. See CARNELL supra note 8, at 407 (asserting that common equity is the "purest
form of equity" because it does not mature, has no attendant dividend obligations and
" [i] n any liquidation of the bank, it gets paid only after all other claims have been paid
in full[,]" including those of depositors) (emphasis added): Hucrtas, supra note 41
([omn eqiyi eil eause] . he~re is noob- ato to pay dividends or to
effect distributios s eold The failure t1 a a d i is an evt o
default and cantgereoisolvny rbakunc pcodings. "),
44. See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 785 (explaining that Tier 2 Capital debt imposes
obligations); Huertas, supra note 41 (noting that banks need to make inees paymnts
on their debts).
45. See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 785 (explaining that although debt is an
obligation for banks, it can constitute Tier 2 Capital); Hucrtas, supra note 41 (" [T] he
fail to make an ine p c Iuld be an evet E , 1f defalt and ultimaelyI be
wound, for a bankruptcy proceeding.").
46. See CARNEL spr note 8, at 408 ("1n any liquidation, [Tier 2 Capital] can get
paid only after deposits ... have been paid in full."); Hucrtas, supra note 41 ( 11
apitl su be capital th can a b l on a rn asI, or capital
1hd a le in iolc ri 1 o de posit(or' los in ian moE-y
47. See CARNLLL, upra nOtC 8, at 405 (explaining that creditors have rights to
obtain the value of certain assets based on the priority of their claim); see also Huertas,
supra note 41 (explaining that depositors have priority in a liquidation).
48. See Hucrtas, supra note 41 (explaining that Tier 1 Capital is meant to ensure
that the bank can meet its operating expenses as a "going-concern," while Tier 2
Capital is meant to ensure depositors are protected during a liquidation when the
banks is a "gone concern"); see also BASEL 111, supra note 18. 1 58 (stating that the
criteria for inclusion in Tier 2 Capital requires that the instrument be "subordinated to
depositors and general creditors of the bank").
49. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 1[ 44 (establishing [ha[ the risk-wveighted capital
ratio should be 8%).
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8%.5o As an example of how the requirement works, imagine a
bank with US$200 in assets. If the USS200 included USS100 in
low-risk OECD government bonds, Basel I weighs this asset at
0%, and weighs US$100 in corporate loans at 100%, and Basel I
requires an 8% ratio of capital to the bank's portfolio of assets.)
Therefore the bank must hold a minimum of US$8 total in Tier
1 and Tier 2 capital.5 2
The effectiveness of Basel I's attempt to enhance bank
soundness has been debated. 51 Some scholars praised the
agreement as an ideal example of international cooperation.54
Other scholars have noted that the non-binding nature of the
agreement could mean that banks in the countries that chose to
implement the new regulations would be burdened with new
compliance costs, while banks in countries choosing to forego
Basel I would bear no such burden.55
Commentators also criticized Basel I for failing its mission
of making capital requirements standard across jurisdictions
because the "soft" nature of the law leads to regulatory
arbitrage.5 6 In other words, a bank could benefit by complying
50. See id.
51. See CARNEIi, supra note 8, at 414-15 (providing a more realistic example that
involves a nine-step calculation). The example provided above is simply for illustrative
purposes and is calculated (.08 x [(100 x 0) + (100 x 1)]).
52. See spra note 51 and accompanying text.
53. See CARNELL, supra note 8, at 404 (discussing how banks could take advantage
of the simple risk weighing system); see also Narissa Lyngen, Basel lll: Dynamics of State
Implementation, 53 HARV. INTI. L.J. 519, 524-25 (2012) (noting that Basel I initially
seemed like a success but was also criticized because of its simplc risk weighing system).
54. See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 783 ("Some scholars have emphasized the
importance of the Basel Committee as a model for future regulatory reform."); see also
Lyngen, supra note 53, at 519 ("Basel III ... along with the Basel Committee and its
negotiation process, have been hailed as an exemplar of international regulation and
law-making. . . .").
55. See Lyngen, supra note 53, at 522 ("Critics also argue that the regulatoly
solutions that TRNs create are often not uniformly beneficial. Instead, regulatory
coordination at the international level often has a distributive eflect, with some states
gaining at the expense of others. Variations among states' domestic regulated
sectors ... [can lead to] distinct Costs of implementation for each state . . . ."); see also
Fed Approves New Bank Capital Rales, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 4, 1988 ("Following
the adoption of the Basel Accord. bank analysts say many big US banks would have to
limit growth. control costs more aggressively and sell assets to meet the standards.").
56. See CARNEI., supra note 8, at 404 (discussing how banks could "game the
systen"): see also John Holman, A Flawed Solution: The Difficulties oflMandatingA Leverage
Ratio In the United States, 84 S. (AL. L. REV. 713, 725-26 (2011) ("Regulatory arbitrage
occurs when a bank exploits the difference between its actual risk level and that
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with Basel I's capital mandates, even though the actual risk it
assumes would call for even more capital coverage than required
by Basel I.5 For example, all OECD debt was weighted at zero
percent. " But if one OECD country was substantially more risky,
and thus had higher interest bearing debt, a bank could receive
this high-risk, high-return interest rate without having to allocate
any additional capital to account for the increased risk. 59
Similarly, scholars have argued that because Basel I does not
mandate the members to adopt it, such an agreement is not
"truly law".o Others Scholars have responded to the "soft" law
argument by noting that that despite its non-binding nature,
Basel I has been historically treated as mandatory."' The United
States' adoption of Basel I into law further suggests the
agreement carries substantial weight. 62 The United States
implied by its regulatory position. . . . [B]anks could engage in regulatory arbitrage
under Basel I by manipulating their holdings so as to include the riskiest assets within
each risk category. Given that Basel I's risk weightings were fairly blunt, banks'
tendency to manage their holdings in this way could allow banks to carry less capital
than their risk profiles warranted.").
57. See supra note 56 (explaining how banks could achieve this through regulatory
arbitrage).
58. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining that OECD government
bonds were weighted at zero percent).
59. See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 793 ("Moreover, if the risk weight assigned to
one loan is far below its inherent risk, the bank wvill replace this asset wvith a higher
yielding loan requiring the same or lss regulatory capital. Thus, a 'bank may engage in
costly 'regulatory arbitragc to effectively evade the regulatory capital requirement.");
see generally Holman, supra note 56 (explaining how regulatory arbitrage occurs).
60. See, e.g., Aric C. Ecrnisse, Banking on Cooperation: The Role of the G-20 In
Iaproving The International Financial Architecture, 22 DLKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 239, 250
(2012) ("Scholars have proposed various conceptions of soft law, wvith some even
denying that non-binding soft law is truly law. . . . but financial institutions quickly
recognize the indirect (or practically binding) lcgal effect of financial standards and
start to comply with those standards soon after they are officially adopted by
international regulators."); see Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law:
Alternatives, Complements and Antagonists in International Governance. 94 MINN. L. RLV.
706, 712-17 (20 10) (des ribing the debate over the force of soft law).
61. See Lyngen, supra note 53, at 530 (quoting how scholars note that the
agreement has practical binding effect); Tarbert, supra note 24, at 782 ("Thus,
'[w]ithout in any way approaching the legal satus of a treaty, . . . [the] agreement is
considered to be binding on its ncnbcrs' .... Committee pronouncements, despite
their lack of formal force, exert in practice a ve ry powerful influence in the generation
of national and regional legal rules and formal institutional structures.").
62. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Standardized
Framework, 73 Fed. Reg. 43982, 42984 (Jul. 29, 2008) (noting that parts of Basel I were
implemented into US regulations); CARNELL , supra note 8 at 404 ("This accord [Basel
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implemented Basel 1, including the minimum capital ratio,
through various regulations issued from the 1990s to early
2000s.6
But as global finance transactions became more complex
during this time, the BCBS felt that a new agreement was
necessary to improve on the simple five risk weight approach
espoused by Basel .64 In June 2004, the Basel Committee
approved a new agreement which sought to increase the risk
sensitivity of the capital defined in Basel I, provide for more
disclosure requirements for regulatory capital, and overall,
provide a better framework for determining minimum capital
standards.65
B. Basel H
The new Basel II accords established a new global standard
for minimum capital requirements by instituting a three-pillar
approach: "minimum capital requirements, supervisory review,
and market discipline".6@ Like the first accord, Basel II sought to
1] established a basic framework for risk-based capital standards, and U.S. and other
regulators then adopted risk-based standards conforming to that framework.").
63. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Standardized
Framework, 73 Fed. Reg 43982. 43984 (July 29, 2008) ("In 1989 the agencies
implemented a risk-based capital framework for U.S. banking organizations (general
risk-based capital rules). The agencies based the framework on ... [Basel 1], released
by the Basel Conimittee on Banking Supervision (Basel Comniittec) in 1988 . .. ."); see
also CARNLLL, supra note 8 at 404 ("This accord [Basel 1] established a basic framework
for risk-based capital standards, and U.S. and other regulators then adopted risk-based
standards conforming to that framework. Although [Basel I] requires the United States
to apply those standard only to large, intLernationally active banks, the federal banking
agencies have chose to apply the standards to all FDIC-insured banks.").
64. See BASEL II, supra note 18, I 15 (noting that the framework was meant to
ensure that it "keeps pace with market developments and advances in risk management
practices."); see also id. I 18 ("Over the last decade, a number of banking organisations
have invested resources in modeling the credit risk arising from their significant
business operations. Such models are intended to assist banks in quantifying,
aggregating and managing credit risk across geographic and product lines.").
65. See id. 1[ 10 (" [T]hc revised Framework is more risk sensitive than the 1988
Accord."); see also id. 1[ 11 ("In addition, the disclosures provided under the third pillar
of this Framework will be essential in ensuring that market discipline is an eflective
complement to the other two pillars."); id. 1 4 ("The fundamental objective of the
Conimittce's work to revise the 1988 Accord has been to develop a framework that
would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking
system . . ..
66. See id. 1 4 (noting that tre revised accord is based on three pillars: "mninimuml
capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline"); Abel Elizalde, Fron
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establish standardized international banking capital standards
and reduce regulatory arbitrage.67 Yet, unlike the other accords,
the primary focus was not on capital standards.@8 Basel 11 largely
maintained the same standards for Tier 1 Capital.69 One of its
most significant changes, however, was to allow banks to include
short term (under two year maturity) unsecured subordinated
debt into their capital base (numerator) as Tier 3 Capital, in
addition to the already existing long term (over five year
maturity) unsecured subordinated debt allowed in Tier 2
Capital.70 This is notable because it frustrates the accords' goal
of protecting depositors by effectively allowing a bank to
introduce an additional illiquid instrument into its capital
structure. 1 This is just one example of why, as discussed below,
Basel 11 was criticized as being an ineffective framework for bank
soundness.
Basel I to Basel II: An Analysis of the Three Pillars 1 (Feb. 2006),
http://ww .abelelizalde.com/pdf/basel% -201%2Oto%2Obasel%202.pdf
67. See BASEL 11, supra note 18, 1 1 ("This report presents the outcome of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's ('the Committee') work over recent years
to secure international convergence on revisions to supervisory regulations governing
the capital adequacy of intLernation ally active banks."); Id. 1[ 4 ("The fundamental
objective of the Committee's work to revise the 1988 Accord has been to ... [ensure]
that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive
inequality among intLernationally active banks.").
68. Compare id. 5 (explaining that although the accord is significantly revising
the risk sensitivity of the capital requirements, it retains "key elements of the 1988
capital adequacy framework, including the general requirement for banks to hold total
capital equivalent to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets ... and the delinition of
eligible capital."), with BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 48 (focusing on changes to the
definition of cligible capital).
69. See BASEL II, supra note 18, [ 41 (explaining that "the definition of eligible
regulatory capital, as outlined in the 1988 Accord ... remains in place" except for a few
modifications involving risk weighing certain assets).
70. See BASEL II, supra note 18, 1 44 ni.10 (adopting the "deiinition of Tier 3
capital as set out in the Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market
Risk .... "); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMLNTS BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION.
AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET RISKS 5 (2005),
http://ww.bis.org/publ/bcbS119.htm (" [T]hc principle form of cligible capital ...
consists of shareholders' equity and retained earnings (ticr 1 capital) and
supplementary capital (tier 2 capital) as delined in the 1988 Accord. But banks may
also ... employ a third tier of capital ('tier 3), consisting of short-term subordinated
debt. . . ."); see also BASEL 1, supra note 17, 1 23 ("Subordinated term debt instruments
with a minimum original term to maturity of over five years may be included within the
supplenentary elements of capital.").
71. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text (explaining how subordinated
term debt is a less absorbent form of capital than Tier I equity).
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The new provisions of Basel 11 focused primarily on the
calculation of the denominator of the risk-based capital ratio.72
It devised two alternative approaches for measuring capital
adequacy.73 The first approach, the standardized approach,
assigns risk weights to assets based on external credit ratings,
instead of basing the risk weight on the type of asset.74 The
second approach, the Internal Ratings Based Approach,
introduces an "internal ratings based" ("IRB") computer
modeling scheme that allowed banks to use their internal risk
management to weigh the riskiness of bank assets.7 The Accord
also demanded more disclosures about how institutions
calculate their minimum capital requirements.76 The new rules
were to be effective by the end of 2006.77
These new proposals, particularly those that allowed the
banks to use the calculations of their own risk models to weigh
72. See BASEL II, supra note 18, [ 52 (keeping the numerator the same while
emphasizing "revisions to the 1988 Accord for risk weighting" purposes); Id. 1 44
("Total risk-weighted assets are determined by multiplying the capital requirements for
market risk and operational risk by 12.5 (i.e., the reciprocal of the minimum capital
ratio of 8%) and adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets for
credit risk."). This is more complicated than the "simple" risk weights provided by
Basel I. See BASEL I, supra note 17, 1 29 (discussing the simpler risk weights establishing
by Basel I).
73. See BASEL II, supra note 18, 1[ 50 ("The Committee proposes to permit banks a
choice between tvo broad methodologies for calculating their capital requirements for
credit risk. One alternative will be to measure credit risk in a standardized manner
supported by external credit assessment."); Id. 151 ("The alternative methodology ...
would allow banks to use their internal ratings systems for credit risk.").
74. See id. 1 50 ("One alternative will be to measure credit risk in a standardized
manner, supported by external credit assessment."); id. 1 53 (articulating that claims
on central banks that have an "AA" rating are risk weighed at zero percent); supra
notes 27-32 and accompanying text (explaining Basel Is risk weighing system).
75. See BASEL 11, supra note 18. 1 211 (" [Banks using the] IRB approach may rely
on their own internal estimates of risk components in determining the capital
requirCment for a given exposure."); BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS 1BASEL COMIM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION. AN EXPLANATORY NOTE oN BASEL 11 IRB RISK WVEIGHT
FUNCTIONS 1 (2005), available at http://wvv.bis.org/bcbs/irbrisk weight.pdf.
76. See BASEL II, supra note 18, 753 ("In particular, banks will be required to
disclose features of their internal methodologies used in calculating minimum capital
requirements."); Id. 809 ("The Committee aims to [develop] . . . a set of disclosure
requirements which will allow market participants to assess key pieces of information
on ... the capital adequacy of the institution. The Committec believes that such
disclosures have particular relevance under the Framework, where reliance on internal
mlthodologics gives banks more discretion in assessing capital requirements.").
77. See id. 1 2 ("The CommitCec intends the Framework set out here to be
available for implementation as of year-end 2006.").
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assets, were criticized as being "unreliable" by some scholars.71
Some commentators have concluded that Basel II was not
effective at accurately matching a bank's credit risk to the capital
it had to raise.79 Interestingly, the heavy reliance on computer
models to calculate credit risk, blamed in part for the 2008
financial crisis, was specifically endorsed by Basel II.s
Partly reflecting these concerns, the US agencies limited
their implementation of the Basel 11 standards to a few of the
largest internationally active banks at that time.,' The final rules
implementing Basel II were effective April 1, 2008.82 At the time,
however, most banks were subject to rules that were based on
78. See CARNEIL, supra note 8, at 405 (asserting that large banks internal models
"proved unreliablc"); see, e.g., Daniel Heimel, Regulatory Consolidation and Cross-Border
Coordination: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 28 YAE J. ON REG. 213, 240 (2011)
(noting that an FDIC report had articulated "scrious deficiencies in the proposals that
regulators use the banks' own internal risk-inanagcent models in Setting capital
requirements").
79. See (ARNF1L1, supra note 8, at 405 (explaining that "by reducing risk-weights
for securities and borrowers with high credit ratings, it facilitated a decline in capital
levels," and the credit ratings later were shown to not accurately reilect the risk of
capital); Marianne Ojo. Basel III. Responses to Consultative Documents, Vital Aspects of the
Consultative Processes and the Journey Culminating in the Present Framework (Part 2), 30
No. 10 BANKING & FIN.SERVTS. P'OL'Y REP. 15 (2011) ("[C]apital requirements for credit
risk as a probability of default of an exposure decreases in the economic upswing and
increases during the downturn .... [This] may result in credit institutions raising their
capital during periods when its is costly for them . . . .").
80. See BASF II, supra note 18, 1 417 ("Credit scoring models and other
mechanical procedures are permissible as the primary or partial basis of rating
assignments, and may play a role in the estimation of loss characteristics."); Avinash D.
Pcrsaud, Banking on the Right Path, 45 FIN. & DEV. MAGAZINF 29, 33 (2008) ("Basel II
considers the use of computer models ... sophisticated. But again, this is
pseudoscience ... and will eventually cause systemic collapse.").
81. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework, 71
Fed. Reg. 55830. 52841 (proposed Sept. 25. 2006) ("Outside the United States,
countries that are replacing Basel I with the New Accord generally have required all
banks to comply with the New Accord, but ... the United States ... takes a different
approach. [The rule] focuses on only the largest and most internationally active
banks."); Malloy, supra note 14, at (4) [b] ("In December 2007, the four regulators
jointly published final rules iniplementing Basel 11 for the largest, internationally active
U.S. banks."); see also Steven Sloan, Bankers Maintain Criticism of US Version of Basel 11,
172 AM. BANKER 66 (2007) (explaining that "many companies" including Bank of
America and Citigroup urged regulators to not apply certain aspects of Basel 11 to the
large banks).
82. See Risk-1Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework-
Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (noting that the rule is "effective April 1,
2008"); Malloy, supra note 14, at [4] (b) (noting that the "final rules [implementing
Basel II] were effective April 1, 2008").
US RULES BASED ON BASEL III
Basel I, with some revisions to risk weighing of assets. 1
Therefore, unlike Basel 1, the US agencies did not adopt Basel II
for most banks.84
By the end of the financial crisis, some commentators
argued that the reliance on the credit ratings was one of the
reasons Basel II standards did not establish adequate levels of
bank capital during the crisis.85 If a bank obtained a triple-A
("AAA") rated asset from an OECD country, for example, it was
required to hold zero additional capital for that asset under
Basel II's standardized risk weight approach> But, if the AAA
asset was incorrectly rated, and was actually as risky as a triple-C
("CCC") asset, and ultimately failed, the bank would not have
enough capital to absorb this loss because it was not previously
required to allocate any capital for that risky CCC asset.8 Thus
the failure to accurately rate debt, as in the previous example,
may cause the bank to be unable to absorb its losses, to the
detriment of depositors.8 As a result of the agreement's failures
to protect banks from the financial crisis, the Basel Committee
renewed attempts to enhance banking soundness and allow
83. See Malloy, supra note 14, at [4](b) ("The overwhelming majority of U.S.
banking institutions would be required cither to continue to apply the 1988 Basel I
standards, or the new and more risk-sensitive Basel IA."). This is not entirely surprising,
given that of the over 250 page Accord, two pages are devoted to discussing the
numerator (Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital) while the rest focuses on the denominator, rules
for assessing the proper way to weigh risk. See generally, BASEL II, supra note 18.
84. See Risk-Bascd Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework, 71
Fed. Reg. 55830, 55832 (proposed Sept. 25, 2006) (noting that the rules apply to
"internationally active banking organization" which is defined as having at least
USS250 billion of assets); Malloy, supra note 14, at [41 (b) (noting that Basel 11 did not
apply to most banks).
85. See, e.g., BASEL II, supra note 18, 1 53 (using Standard & Poor's ("S&P")
ratings to weigh central bank debt); Lyngcn, supra note 53, at 526 ("Basel II also
provided several options for risk assessment, including a standardized method that
incorporated external credit ratings (later viewed as a primary reason for Basel II's
failure to predict the 2007-09 crisis) .")
86. See BASLL II, supra note 18, 1 53 (weighing AAA rated claims on a central bank
at zero percent).
87. See Tarbert, supra note 24, at 794 (noting that banks can give a "loan to
central governments by purchasing sovereign debt and hold no capital against such
assets"); see also supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (explaining that a failure to
hold enough capital to absorb losses may lead the bank to fail).
88. See supra notes 37-42 (providing an examplc tLha shows how a bank may fail if
it does not have enough capital to absorb a loss).
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banks to better withstand the effects of a severe economic
contraction."
C. Basel III
The Basel Committee issued the new framework in
December 2010."0 Basel III builds "on the three pillars of the
Basel II framework ."9 The main goal of the new agreement is to
strengthen "the international regulatory framework" by focusing
on the quality and transparency of banks' capital structure.9 For
the first time since Basel I, the agreement enhances the type of
regulatory capital (the numerator of the minimum capital ratio)
banks are required to maintain." Basel III accomplishes this by
limiting what can constitute Tier 1 Capital and increasing the
overall amount of capital banks must maintain.9 4 It completely
eliminates the riskier unsecured Tier 3 Capital allowed under
89. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMLNTS BA.SLL COMM. ON BATNKING SUPERVISION,
REVISTONS TO THE BASEL II MARKET RTSK FRAMEWORK [ 1 (2009), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcsb158.pdf ("[T]he financial crisis began in mid-2007, an
important source of losses and of the build up of lcverage occurred in the trading
book. A main contributing factor was that the current capital framework for market
risk, based on the 1996 Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks,
does not capture some key risks. In response. the Basel Committee ... supplements the
current value-at-risk-based trading book [to better reflect certain market risks]. .")
(emphasis added).
90. See BA.SLL III, supra note 18 (including the date on the cover page).
91. Id. 7.
92. See id. 11 2, 6-7 ("[T]hc Committee also aims to improve risk management
and governance as well as strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. . To
address the market failures revealed by the crisis, the Committee is introducing a
number of fundamental reforms to the international regulatory framework .... The
reforms raise both the quality and quantity of the regulatory capital base and enhance
the risk coverage of the capital framework. ").
93. See id. 1 48 ("A key element of the new definition of capital is the greater
focus on common equity, the highest quality component of a bank's capital.").
Technically, the committee published enhancements to the 1996 standards in 2009,
but this was an addition to Basel 11, while Basel III is an entirely new agreement. See id.
1 2 n.2 (discussing that the Committee relcased the enhancements in 2009).
94. See i. 53 (limiting the definition of Tier I Capital to either common shares
or another instrument that mcets 14 requirements that mimics the properties of
common shares); id. 1[ 129 (introducing the conservation buffer in addition to the
regulatory capital minimum requirements).
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Basel 1I.9 Like the previous accords, the capital ratio includes a
risk-weighted calculation of a bank's assets.'
The new agreement goes beyond just reforming the basic
capital ratio.97 Reflecting on the causes of the financial crisis, it
establishes a new countercyclical buffer intended to offset the
effects of asset bubbles, or extreme price increases that do not
reflect the actual value of an asset." This buffer is part of the
agreement's express attempt to take macro-economic trends
into account. 9 Like Basel II, Basel III increases disclosure
requirements regarding how banks calculate their capital ratios,
furthering the goal of market transparency. oo Finally, Basel III
also establishes a new liquidity ratio (i.e., whether a bank has
enough cash to cover immediate expenses), which is meant to
ensure that banks can withstand periods of stress during a
financial crisis.'" The increased amount of ratios and associated
costs is expected to decrease the profitability of banks in the
95. Compare id 1 49 (confining the elements of capital in Tier I and Tier 2), with
BASEL 11, supra note 18, 1[ 39 (recognizing Tier 3 capital).
96. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 50 ("Total Capital (Tier I Capital plus Tier 2
Capital) must be at lcast 8.0% of risk-weighted assets at all timcs."); supra notes 49-51
and accompany ing text (discussing how Basel I established minimum capital
requirements which were adopted with few modifications by Basel II).
97. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing how Basel III
increases the quality of Tier 1 Capital but also adds new layers of required capital such
as the -conservation buffer").
98. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 2 ("The Committee's comprehensive reform
package addresses the essons of the financial crisis."); Id. 1 137 ("The countercyclical
butler ... will be deployed by national jurisdictions when excess aggregate credit
growth is judged to be associated with a build-up of system-widC risk to ensure the
banking system has a buffer of capital to protect it against future potential losses.");
William C. Dudley, Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Asset Bubbles and
the Inplications for Central Bank Policy, Remarks at The Economic Club of New York
(Apr. 7, 2010) ("By an asset bubble, I mcan pice increases (or declines) that become
unmoored from fundamental valuations.").
99. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 137 ("The countercyclical buffer aims to ensure
that banking sector capital requirements take account of the macro-financial
environment in which banks operate.").
100. See id. 1[ 91 (requiring increased disclosure requirements regarding how a
bank computes its capital requirements in order to "help improve transpareincy of
regulatory capital and improve market discipline"); BASEL II, supra note 18, 809
(requiring increased disclosure requirements).
101. See BASEL 111, supra note 18, 1 40 (" [The liquidity ratio] will help ensure that
global banks have sufficient unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets to ofiset the net
cash outflows it could encounter under an acute short-term stress scenario. The
specified scenario is built upon circumstances experienced in the global financial crisis
that began in 2007 . . . .").
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short term as they adjust their internal capital composition to
meet the new stringent requirements.102
In July 2010, shortly before Basel III was finalized, Congress
enacted The Wall Street Refoirm and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd-Frank"). 13 It requires that regulators establish new
banking capital requirements. 104 In August 2012, the US
agencies issued new proposed agency rules intended to
implement both Basel III and Dodd-Frank.lo5
The proposed rules introduce several changes to the US
regulatory scheme. oo Among other things, the new pending
legislation brings savings and loans companies under the capital
requirements purview of the Federal Reserve. 107 Thus, unlike the
selective treatment the US federal agencies applied to only large
internationally active banks while implementing Basel II, the
proposed rules apply to almost all banks in the United States
and all US savings and loan companies regardless of size. 0 s As
required by Dodd-Frank, these new standards are the "generally
102. See MACROECONOMIC ASSSSMENT GRP., BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, FINAL
REPORT: A'SSESSING THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE TRANSITION TO STRONGER
CAPITAL AND LIoULIDITY RLoUIREMINTs 2 (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/
othp 12.pdf (concluding that the higher capital equity requirements will cause a short
tern decrease in growth); supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that
higher capital ratios impose costs on banks).
103. Pub. T. No. 111-203, 1144 Sat. 1,176 (2010); see supra note 90 and
accompn.lyingte (XI noLing 1hat Basel I was published in Decinber 2010.
104. See 12 U.S.C. 5371 (2006) ("The appropriate Federal banking agencies
shiall establish m; inlu risk-based capital requirements. ... )
105. See Re atory Capial Rules: Regulatory Capital ImlplmCen1ttion of Basel
III. Minimum RegulaIory (pitai Ratios. Capiai Adequacy, T.ainsirion Provisions, aind
Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Peg. 169, 52793 (proposed Aug. 30, c012)
[hereina.fer RCgulory (apil:i Rules] (TI he agenuics are proposing (o rcvise their
risk-based and leverage cp1ita requireimnts consistIn With agreeiments reaiched.
[B lasel III] .... [T]he revisions set orthin this [proposed rule] are consistent with
sction 171 of the... [DoddFrank Acl, which requires Ihe agencics Lo establish
iniuninm risk bascd and leverage c-apnia requirements."\
106. See, e.g, Regulato r y Capital Rules, spra note 105, 77 Fed. Peg. at 169, 54801
establishing ai new 'o10mon e(uity tier 1 c.aial riio; Id. at 169, 52811 (noting a new
Tier 2 Capital sructurc).
107. See id. at 169, 5'795 (clarifyling that the proposed rules are to "apply to all
banking organizaions currently subjec 111inimlca pital reice1nmnts including . ..
state and federal saing L . aiations"; id. at 169. 52834 ("S111411 sae incinber banks
ad smiall savigs and loan hiold;ng comripaiies (covered small banking organi 7ations)
would be subject to the [proposed rulks]
108. See supra noLe 107 and accompanying text (stating which banks are subject
under the proposed rules).
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applicable" requirements for all US banking organizations.o9
These new rules represent the federal agencies' comprehensive
efforts to reform the entire banking system, and thus protect
depositors from the losses incurred during the crisis, by
strengthening capital requirements)'
11. BASEL III v. US PROPOSED RULES
Part 11 focuses on the US response to the capital enhancing
mechanisms of Basel III. Each subsection of Part 11 reviews how
closely the US proposed rules track the capital enhancing
mechanisms introduced by Basel III. Specifically, Part II.A--C
discuss the numerator and overall capital ratio, Parts II.D-E
explain the new buffers. Part II.F also briefly discusses how the
proposed rules update the FDICA's prompt corrective action
(PCA) framework in order to align the capital requirements.
Finally, the phase-in schedule for these new requirements is
noted in Part II.G.
Furthermore, this Part shows how the US proposed rules
essentially implement the Basel III framework for the capital
numerator of the ratio. The rules essentially establish the same
minimums and requirements for total capital and buffers, but
differ in three main ways. I' First, the new rules limit the
application of the counter-cyclical buffer to only the largest
banks.112 Second, the rules are mandated by Dodd-Frank to
109. See 12 U.S.C. 5371 (2006) (mandating that federal agencies establish
"generally applicable risk based capital requirements" to insured depository
institutions); Regulaiory (aial Rules, supra n1oe 105. 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 52792
("[T]he revisions set forth in this [proposed rule] are consistent wvith section 171 of
[Dodd-Frank], which requires the agencies to establish minimum risk-based and
leverage capital requircmncits.").
I10. Se e gulato ( Capital Ples, spra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 5'794
annoucing , th. h OCC he Fed, anld he FDIC "are proposing conprecnlsive
revisions Lo hirU rcgulatoi.ry capiali framork" and decliig, " lheCse propos.is
would revise the agencies' current general risk-based es) upra note 7-12 and
accolpanlyiLg teXI (Cxplaining hlow in csed capLia rcquircmncins protect (1posinors
froml losses1 ).
111. Compare Regulatoly Capital Ples, upra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 54798
esaIblishig a Wal capial r.aioL of 8% -nd adopting B.sel III's buffers). witi supra
notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing how Basel III adds new layers of
required capital including the capital conservation and countercyclical buffers).
112. See Reulaoy C.aifal Ruks. supra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 52805
(explaining how the United States applies the coultercyclical buffer). Basel Ill applies
to "internationally active banks" regardless of size. See BASEL III, supra note 18, [ 47
2013] 1083
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implement a quicker phase in schedule for certain banks."
Finally, the rules align the capital requirements to the PCA
framework.114
A. Tier 1 Common Equity
Basel III emphasizes the use of common equity as a way to
ensure high-quality capital. 115 This emphasis on holding
common stock derives from the belief that equity is best able to
absorb losses, and thus, protect depositors.' I Accordingly, it
establishes a new regulatory requirement known as the Common
Equity Tier 1 Capital. 11 It raises the minimum equity
requirements to 4.5% of all risk-weighted assets.118 This capital
must consist of mainly common shares of stock plus retained
earnings.1 1 Basel III does not allow debt-like instruments to be
included in Tier 1.120
The US federal banking agencies' proposed rules mirror
Basel III's establishment of Common Tier 1 Equity.121 The US
regulations would mandate that Tier 1 Common Equity be
(stating that scope of application is the same as Basel II); 1ASEL II, supra note 18, 1 20
("This framework will be applied on a consolidated basis to internationally active
banks.").
113. See Regula.iory C.apial Rules. supra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. i 169, 52824
(discussing the transitional requirements).
114. See id. at 169, 5'807 (noting how the United States proposes to update its
PCA framework).
115. See BASLL III, supra note 18, 1 48 ("A key element of the new definition of
capital is the greater focus on common equity, the highest quality component of a
bank's capital.").
116. See supra, notes 40-48 and accompanying tcxt (discussing why equity capital
absorbs the most loss and protects depositors). The Committee equates Common
Equity as a "fully loss absorbing capital." BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 142.
117. See BASEL 111, supra note 18, 1[ 52 (defining what may constitute "Commnon
Equity Tier I capital").
118. Compare BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 50 ("Common Equity Tier I must be at
least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times."), with BASEL I, supra note 17. 1[ 44
(requiring equity to only be 4% of risk weighted assets).
119. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 52 (declaring that "Common Equity Tier 1
capital consist of the sum of common shares issued by the bank and retained earnings
along with other types of income).
120. See id. 52-53 (leaving out debt-like instruments from the definition of
Tier 1 Capital and explicitly stating that instruments included in Tier 1 Capital are not
obligatory," and non-payment cannot be an event of default).
121. See Regulioy C.apial Rules. supra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. a 3 169, 52801
esablishing ai common euiLy tier 1 capiali aiio of 4.5 lhat is "consistenI with Basel
III").
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comprised of mostly common stock.12 2 The two frameworks use
the same definition for what may constitute Tier 1 Equity
Capital.23 Under both Basel III and the US rules, Tier 1 Equity
Capital may include, among other things, instruments that have
the most subordinated claims in a liquidation proceeding and a
banking organization must have the ability to not make any
distributions on the instrument without triggering default.124
B. Additional Tier 1 Capital
Basel III introduces "Additional Tier 1 Capital" to the
Common Equity Tier 1 to constitute total Tier 1 Capital.' The
crucial aspect of this requirement is that the Additional Tier 1
instruments are "subordinated to depositors, general creditors
and subordinated debt of the bank", are perpetual, and allow
for complete discretion regarding whether dividends or other
distributions must be paid to the owner. 12 Generally, these
instruments include noncumulative perpetual preferred shares
and other relatively rare forms of equity.127 The minimum Tier 1
Capital Ratio, including Tier 1 Common Equity and Additional
Tier 1 Capital, is 6% to total risk-weighted assets.1 21
The proposed rules also establish Basel III's additional Tier
1 Capital structure. 129 They greatly restrict what types of
preferred shares can be allowed, essentially just allowing
122. See id. at 52810-11 ("The agencies continue to expect under the proposal
that voting common stockholders' equity ... should be the dominant element within
common equity tier 1 capital.").
123. See id. (listing the criteria that Common equiLy tier 1 capital instruments must
meet); BASEL III, supra note 18, [53-54 (same).
124. See ReguIatory Capilal Rulcs, supra not( 105. 77 Fed. Reg. a1 169, 52810-11
(listing these and other criteria); BASEL 111, supra note 18, 1[ 9 same)
125. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 54 ("Additional Tier I capital consists of the
sum of the following elements ... ").
126. See id. 1[ 55 (listing the criteria for inclusion in Additional Tier 1 capital).
127. See CARNELL, supra note 8, at 407 (explaining the such shares may be
included in additional Tier 1 Capital and the other forms of equity "are too rarefied to
mattCr for our purposes"); Gregory J. Lyons & (han E. Casey, Basell-An Ihitial Piece of
the Global Puzzle, 30 No. 7 BANKING & FIN. SFRVS POL'Y REP. 21, 22-23 (2011) (" [N]on-
cumulative perpetual preferred is the only type of existing widely distributed security
cearly able to qualif under this category.").
128. See BASETL III, supra note 188, 50 ("Tier I Capital must be at least 6.0% of
risk-weighted assets at all times.").
129. See Rglr Capial Rules. supa noic 105. 77 Fedl. Rg. at 169, 52812
(esitablnhng Add;;onad Tier I Capital ;n a manner "consistent with Basel Il").
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common stock-like securities that have higher priority in a
bankruptcy proceeding to be included into Tier 1 as
"Additional" Tier 1 Capital.so This reflects the overall focus of
ensuring that banks have loss-absorbing capital in their Tier 1
Capital. I 3 For example, non-cumulative perpetual preferred
stock would expressly qualify as additional Tier 1 Capital.'3 This
type of capital is included because it is not cumulative (i.e., the
contractual obligations of past dividends do not come due), it
has no maturity date and no incentive to be repurchased by the
company (i.e., is perpetual or not redeemable), and its holders
get paid after depositors in a bankruptcy proceeding.' 
C. Total Capital Ratio
Although Basel III eliminates Tier 3 Capital, it still allows
banks to hold Tier 2 Capital.134 Under Basel III, Tier 2 Capital
130. See CARNEIT., supra note 8, at 405-06 (explaining the differences between
cunulative, noncumulative, and perpctual preferred shares). The chart below
compares the two diflerent types of securities.
SECURITY COMMON STOCK NON-CUMULATIVE
FEATURE PERPETUAL PREFERRED
SHARE
DIVIDENDS No obligation No obligation (i.e., non-
cunulative)
MATURITY No obligation to No obligation to redeem (i.e.,
redeem (i.e., perpetual)
permanent)
LIQUIDATION Lowest ranking Lowest ranking except for
common stock holders (i.e.,
preferred)
131. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (explaining that Tier I Capital
is the most able to absorb losses).
132. See Regulr Capial RulCs supra ne 1051 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 52812
("Under the agencies exsting capital rules, non-cumulative perpetual preferred
stock .. would colninue to qualify as addidonl- ie 1 cpia I unC the proposa").
133. See CARNELL, supra note 8, at 405-06 (discussing the differences between
non-cumulative, cumulative, and perpetual preferred shares); see also BiLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1552 (9th. cd. 2009) (defining noncumulative preferred shares as
1 preferred stock that does not have to be paid dividends that are in arrears"); Id. at
1553 (9th. ed. 2009) (delining redeemable stock as "preferred stock that can be
[bought] by the issuing corporation and retired") (emphasis added).
134. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (detailing that Basel III climilated
the use of Tier 3 Capital established by Basel II).
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may include preferred stock and subordinated debt.' 6 Basel III
mandates the total capital ratio (i.e., Tier 1 and Tier 2) to be 8%
to total risk weighed assets. 6 Mirroring this framework, the US
rules also allow subordinated debt and cumulative preferred
stock under Tier 2 Capital.'3 7 Thus, the new accords increase the
capital ratio potentially by over 50% by requiring a minimum of
up to 13% total capital (8% Total Capital plus a potential 5%
buffer consisting of equity capital). "'8 If implemented at its
maximum, as discussed in Part III, this would represent over a
50% increase in total common equity capital that banks had
during the financial crisis (from 6% to 9.5% with the counter
cyclical buffer).13
D. Conservation Buffer
One of the innovations of Basel III is its greater focus on
buffers. 140 This new part of the framework focuses on high
135. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 58 (allowing subordinated debt to be part of
Tier 2 Capital); CARNELL, supra note 8, at 408 ("Tier 2 Capital encompasses everything
cise that can count as capital, including cumulative preferred, intermcdiatc- and long-
term preferred [shares], and subordinated debt . . .
136. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 50 ("Total Capital (Tier I Capital plus Tier 2
Capital) must be at lcast 8.0% of risk-weightcd assets at all times.").
137, See Regu latory Capital Rules, spra note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 5'4813
(statIng h.i II allow-abi Tier 2 (apit1al is "coniSInI with Basel III" ain noting thau
"cuuliive perpetual preferred securiics .... [C]could qualify for inclusion in [Tlicr
4 Capital"); Ed, at 169, 5'815 ("[Miost existing subordinated debt instruments they
[banks currently] include in tier 2 capital would meet the proposed eligibility criteria
for additional tier 1 and tier 2 capital instruments, respectively.").
138. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 11 122, 136 (explaining the buffers). Basel III
introduces a 2.5% conservation buffer and a 2.5% counter cyclical buffer. Id, 1[1[ 129,
139 (establishing the buffers). Historically, the capital ratio has been 8%. See BASEL 1,
supra note 17, 1 44 (establishing the 8% capital to risk weighted assets requirement);
supra note 69 (discussing that Basel 11 kept this requirement the same): supra note 136
(explaining that Basel Ill also required the total capital ratio is 8%). In other words, a
bank could potentially be required to hold 8% in risk-weighted assets and an additional
5% in common equity to risk weighted assets, or a total capital requirement of 13% (a
62.5% increase over the original 8% requirement).
139. See 11). OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED'L RESERVE SYSTEN, DoDD-FRANK ACT
STRESS TEST 2013: SUPLR1SORY STRESS TEST METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 2 (2013)
[hereinafter FEDERAL RESERVE STRESS TEST] (showing a bar chart which indicates that
banks had common equity ratios of about 6% in the fourth quarter of 2008).
140. See BASLL 111, supra note 18, 1 26 ("The Committee is introducing a
fraiework to promote the conservation of capital and the build-up of adcquae buffers
above the minimum that can be drawn down in periods of stress.") (emphasis added);
1088 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:1062
quality capital such as common equity. 141 Basel III requires
banks to maintain a conservation buffer of common equity Tier
1 Capital of 2 .5 % of risk weighted assets in addition to the total
capital ratio requirements (i.e., Tier 1 and Tier 2).142 This means
that, in conjunction with the minimum 4.5% common equity
requirement, 7% of a bank's capital must be comprised of
common equity.43 If a bank's capital falls below this buffer,
Basel III imposes several regulatory restrictions on executive
compensation, including supervisory bonuses, and distributions,
such as cash dividends and stock buy-backs.144 This is distinct
part of the framework-banks cannot use Common Equity used
in Tier 1 to meet the Conservation buffer.'4 5
Consistent with their policy of mimicking Basel III, the US
rules also require banks to maintain a capital conservation
buffer of at least 2.5% common equity. 146 If banks do not
maintain these required standards essentially the same limits on
Ed, 122 ("This section outlines the operation of the capital conservation
buffer . . . .").
141. See id. 129 (stating that the "capital conservation buffer of 2.5% [is]
comprised of Cominon Equity . . . ."); supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text
(explaining why common equity is a high quality capital).
142. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 129 (declaring that the conservation butler is
required "above" or in addition to, the minimum capital requirements).
143. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text (explaining that Basel III
established a 4.5% equity capital requirement); BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 129 n.47
("Conion Equity Tier 1 Imust first be used to meet the minimum capital
requirements ... before the remainder can contribute to the capital conservation
buffer.").
144. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 131 (explaining that banks wvith capital levels
that fall below certain lkvels of Tier 1 Common Equity become subject to restriction on
capital distributions). "For example, a bank with 8% [Tier 1 Common Equity] and no
Additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 capital would meet all minimum capital requirements, but
would have a zero conservation buffer and therefore be subject to the 100% constraint
on capital distributions." Id.
145. Id. 1 129 n.47 ("Cotimon Equity Tier 1 must first be used to meet the
minimum capital requirements ... before the remainder can contribute to the capital
conservation buffer.").
146. See ReguIltoiry Capial Rules, suprOa noe 105, 77 Fed. Reg at 169 5280,").
("The capital conservation buffer would be composed of common equity tier 1 capital
and would be separate from the minimum risk-based capital requirements . .. [A]
banking organization would need to hold a capital conservation buffer in an amount
greater than 2.5 percent of total risk-weighted assts."); Regulaioy Capital Rules. suRi a
note 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 169, 5'795 (explaining that "revisions incorporate changes"
that Basel III articulated and that "this notice (Basel III NPR) proposes the Basel III
revisions to international capital standards related to minimumi requirements,
regulatory capital, and additional capital 'buffers").
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capital distributions kick in, including limits on dividends, and
discretionary bonus payments to executive officers, such as the
CEO. 147 At the lowest range, if the bank maintains a
conservation buffer of less than .06 2 5 %, a bank may not make
any bonus payments to executive officers. 48 This is another
example of how the new agreement and its US counterpart
directly respond to the financial crisis, reflecting a widely held
belief that excessive executive compensation incentivized bank
executives to take more risk in the years leading up to the
financial crisis. 14 Like most of the framework, however,
domestic regulators have discretion in enforcing these
restrictions. 1o
E. Counter-Cyclical Buffer
Basel III also attempts to remedy pro-cyclicality, another
problem thought to have exacerbated the financial crisis.'5 Pro-
cyclicality can increase the negative impact of booms and bust
cycles.12 This occurs especially during financial booms, where
easy access to credit acts as an incentive for firms, including
147. See id. at 169, 5'803 (explaining that falling below the buirer triggers limits
on capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments to executive officers ....
148. See id. at 52804 ("The purpose of limiting restrictions on discretionary bonus
payments to executive officers is to focus these measures on the individuals within a
banking organization who could expose the organization to the greatest risk.").
149. See id. at 52804 (explaining that the purpose of limiting bonus payments to
executives is because they can expose an organization to "the greatest risk."); see also
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, End Bonuses for Bankers, N.Y. TIMFS, Nov. 7, 2011,
http://www .nytimes.comf/2011/11/08/opinion/cnd-bonuses-for-bankers.htmLi
("Honuses are particularly dangerous because they invite bankers to game the system by
hiding the risks of rare but consequential ... disasters [such as the financial crisis].").
150. See Regulatory Capial Rules. supra no(e 105, 77 Fed. Reg. i 169, 52804
("[E]ach agency would retain its authority to permit a banking organization supervised
by that agency to make a capital distribution or a discretionary bonus payment, if the
agency determines that the capital distribution or discretionary bonus payment would
not be contrary to the purposes of the capital conservation buffer or the safety and
soundness of thc banking institution.").
151. See BASLL 111, supra note 18. 1[ 18 ("One of the most destabilising elements of
the crisis has been the procyclical amplification of financial shock throughout the
banking system . . . ."); Ojo, supra note 79, at 15 ("Pro-cyclicality is a term used to
denotC 'the scif-rcinforcing mechanisms within the financial system ... that can
exacerbate boom and bust cycles . . . .").
152. See Ojo, supra note 79, at 18 (defining pro-cyclicality); see also BASLL II, supra
note 18, 1 4 (explaining that tre "crisis was further amplified by a procyclical
deleveraging process . . . .").
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banks, to take on more risk.15 To address this problem, Basel III
introduces a mechanism that requires banks to obtain capital, in
the form of common equity, when it is readily available.1 4
Financial institutions are then required to store it so that it is
available to absorb losses during times when access to credit is
limited. 1 Thus regulators can mandate a bank to hold up to an
additional 2.5% of common equity in addition to minimum
capital ratio and conservation buffer.15 6
This buffer allows authorities to protect banks from
excessive growth by requiring banks to raise common equity
during times where credit is readily available and using this
equity to absorb any losses that occur when access to credit
becomes restricted.15 Banks that fail to meet the required buffer
are subject to the same discretionary capital distribution limits
under the conservation buffer scheme. 's Unlike the other
requirements that are proposed as mandatory minimum
153. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 139 (explaining that the countercyclical bufler
should be used when "a period of excess credit growth [is judged] to be leading to the
buildup of system-wide risk . . . ."); Qjo, sapra note 79, at 16 (asserting that an "example
of a 'fundamental' source of procyclicality is . .. 'excessive risk-taking during periods of
expansion. which results in the buildup of vulnerabilitics").
154. See BASEL III, supra note 18, [ 142 (stating that the, "countercyclical
buffer ... varies between zero and 2.5% of risk weighted assets .... Banks must meet
this buffer with Common Tier 1 Equity or other fully loss absorbing capital .... ").
155. See id. 13 -37 (explaining that the bufler is supposed to help alleviate the
"vicious circlc" that occurs where problems in the "financial system" leads to a
downturn in the economy which then negatively impacts the banking sector); see also
CARNELL, supra note 8, at 418 (explaining that the conservation buirer, which also
requires stored capital, is "aimed at keeping bank's capital well above minimun levels
during good times so that banks can better withstand the stress of bad times").
156. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 139 (explaining that national authorities can
implement a countercyclical buffer that "will vary between zero and 2.5% of risk
weighted assets"): BASEL 111. supra not 18, 1 138(c) (articulating that the
countercyclical buffer "extend[s] the size of the capital conservation buffer").
157. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing how the
countercyclical buffer protcts banks during downturns); see also Ojo, supra note 79. at
19 ("A counter cyclical capital charge, it is contended, 'would require financial
institutions to hold more capital during buoyant periods whilst, lowering the regulatory
capital levels during periods of stress.' Through a rctcntion of earnings during
buoyant periods, a bank is able to conserve excess capital which can be used to absorb
asset write offs during lss buoyant periods and periods of financial stress.").
158. See BASEL III, supra now 18, 1 147 (explaining tha[ the capital lcycl
restrictions are the same between both buffers).
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standards, Basel III explicitly leaves the determination of the
buffer to each individual regulator.1 59
In their approach to counter-cyclical buffers, the US rules
take an uncharacteristic departure from adopting Basel III
capital requirements for most banking organization. 1 o The
proposed rules intend to apply the 2.5% Common Equity Tier 1
Capital counter-cyclical buffer only to banks that are
"interconnected" with other large institutions.1 61 The rules also
enable US regulators to make a determination as to whether this
extra buffer is necessary to protect the overall financial system
based on several factors, such as the ratio of credit to GDP or
other "measures of systemic risk."162 The US rules adopt the
same restrictive scheme on distributions, although banks subject
to the counter-cyclical buffer may have to apply the schemes
differently. 163
159. Compare id. 139 (leaving the implementation of the counter cyclical buffer
to the judgment of each national authority), with id. 1 55 n.16 (" [M] inimum [capital
requirements] refers to the regulator's prescribed minimum requirement, which may
be higher than the Basel III Pillar I minimum requirement.") (emphasis added).
160. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text (explaining that the US rules
adopt the minimum capital standards to most US banking organizations).
161. See Regulatory Capital Rlesi, sipra note 105, at 169, 52805 (elaborating that
"I lhe marial bni10l financial slabilivy from ai counLtercylicl4 bufer ftl11(ion
should be greater witi rCspct LO [i1erconnecd fi11ncil] imsiiixons whereas the
costs of nmplerentation would be too great for smaller Orms). Large interconnected
banks h.vi been referred to as "advanced appro.iAes banks by he proposed rules.
See, e.g., i ("The agencies propose to apply the couniercyclic.1 capil buiffer Only LO
advanced approachei banking organizations, because large bankrng organizatioi
geray.-ly are more inierconnectled With Other iSItultions in the fin.ncial sem.")
162. See id. ("The agencies expect to consider a range of macrocconomic,
financial, and supervisory information indicating an increase in systemic risk including,
but not limited to. the ratio of credit to gross domestic product .. ) Id. (" TI
couit rcyclical capiali buffi t 1 would be linked to the condition of the overall
U.S. financial isygstem- and not the characteristics of an indvidual banking
organ.izaion . ... Id.
163. See id. a3 169. 52804 (establishing the mn.ximnumn payout l rio sceicin for (lie
capital consiervation bulfe~r and noting that "capital distributionsi and bonus resitrictions
applied to 411 aidvancd approa banking organizaion could be more or Iss
stringtC111 han if its c.pi al conservaion buffer were ba-iscd in risk-weictd assets is
calculated by al! bakIng organizations.")
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F. Prompt Corrective Action
As Figure 3 illustrates, the US rules have aligned the PCA
framework to match Basel III's new capital requirements.164The
new Common Equity Tier 1 requirements mean that banks must
maintain at least 4.5% common equity to be considered
"adequately capitalized."'6 Banks below the Tier 1 common




Total RBC Tier 1RBC tier 1 RBC Leverage
measure measure measure Measure(total RBC (tier 1RBC (common equity (leverage
ratio-percent) ratio-percent) tier 1 RBC ratio ratio-percenlt)
(percent)
Well Capitalized ............................ >10 -8 >6.5 5 Unchanged from current rules'.
Adequately Capitalized ................. 6 4.5 4 Do
Undercapitalized ........................... <8 <6 <4.5 <4 Do.
Significantly u dercapitalized <6 <4 <3 <3 Do.
Critically undercapitalized ............. Tangible Equity (detined as tier 1capital plus non-lier 1 perpetual Do.
preferred stocki toTotal Assets <2
Consider the old framework where undercapitalization meant
having a total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) ratio of under 8% or
having a Tier 1 ratio of less than 4%.16 The new PCA framework
164. See id. at 169, 52807, Table 6 (delineatng the new PA 1rinework,
applicalL.ble iO mUos b 1ankiig, o0raziOns; le A s0upr 11o E 1-15 id
accopany ng text (dscussi, the purpose of the PCA 1 arinework)
165. See Reguiory Capital Rules. supra nite 105. al 169, 52807. 'Table 6 (showinug
hat banrks id awt leai a.5%-c "counon equity tier 1 [Risk Based C4pitail ratio" to bc
adeqoately capitali7ed").
166. See id. (showing tha banks witi less than a 4.5% "counuo equity tier 1 [Risk
Bised C(aia] ratio" arie unercapitalie dar.
167, i.
168. See id. Taible 5 ("Currenst P(A Levels" (sowing that b swith less than a
8 total Risk Bas( C4pial raio or( less tha ai 4% [isk Base( (apital] tier I raio is
undfercaptadlized").
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is one of the ways in which the US rules are more demanding
than Basel III.16i9
For example, imagine two different banks: Banks A is
regulated by a jurisdiction governed both by Basel III and a PCA
framework while Bank B operates in a jurisdiction governed by
Basel III without a PCA framework. Assume that both banks'
entire capital structure consists solely of a Tier 1 Equity Capital
ratio of 4 .0%. Both banks have failed to meet their Common
Equity Tier 1 requirement of 4.5% and have failed to meet their
2.5% conservation buffer requirement.170 Accordingly, neither
bank can engage in any capital distributions, such as dividend
payments to stockholders. 171 Bank B has no other duties under
Basel 111; theoretically, Bank B can simply not comply with the
requirements as long as the bank is not concerned with making
capital distributions. 7 2
The PCA framework, on the other hand, requires
regulators to take action against Bank A by treating it as
undercapitalized.1 " Bank A must submit a capital restoration
plan to regulators explaining how it plans on meeting the
required capital minimum requirements.'7 4 If Bank A fails to
169. Seesupra notes 164-168 and accompanying text (explaining why the PCA
framework is more stringent that Basel 111).
170. See BASEL 111, supra note 18, 1 131 (explaining that Basel III established a
4.5% equity capital requirement); Regulatoly Capital Ruiles, spra note 105, at Table 6
171. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting that Common Equity must
first be used to meet the minimum requirements before it can be used for the
conservation buffer); see also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text (articulating
that having a capital conservation buffer of zero means the bank cannot make any
capital distributions).
172. This is an unrealistic assumption in most cases. Restrictions on capital
distribution also include preventing bonus payments to executives as well as other
constraints that would certainly provide an incentive for Bank 1 to comply with the
requirements. The example is for illustrative purposes only.
173. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(b) (1) (C) ("An insured depository institutions is
'undercapitalized' if it fails to meet the required minimum level for any relevant capital
measure."); 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2) ("The appropriate Federal Banking agency shall
carly out this section by taking 1 or more of the following actions . . . .") (emphasis
added); Richard S. Carnell, A Partial Antidote to Perverse Incentives: The EDIC Iprovement
Act of 1991. 12 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 317, 329 (1993), reprinted in CARNELL supra note
8 at 423 [hereinafter Carnell. Perverse Incentives] (noting that the PCA framework
"specifically requires regulators to take timely, effective action to prevent loss to the
[FDIC's] insurance fund.").
174. See 12 U.S.C. 1831o (c) (2) (detailing the process for a bank to submit a
"capital restoration plan"); Carnell, Perverse In cetives, supra note 173, at 425 ("An
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provide a realistic plan, it may be deemed non-viable, and can
be placed in receivership.1 5 Therefore, while Bank B under
Basel III may simply decide not to comply with the capital
requirements and try to withstand its inability to make capital
distributions, the PCA requirements act as "a catalyst for
restoring" Banks A's capital, or will lead to Bank A's demise if it
does nothing. 17 Therefore, the PCA framework provides a
stronger enforcement mechanism than Basel III for ensuring
capital soundness.177
G. Transitional Differences in Phasing Requirements
The proposed rules deviate from certain transition periods
established by Basel III that give banks time to adjust their
capital structure to meet the new capital standards. 7 8 Basel III
becomes effective January 1, 2013. 179It requires banks to meet
the Capital Tier 1 Ratio by 2015.180 The Capital Conservation
undercapitalized institution must submit an acceptable capital restoration plan to the
appropriate Federal Banking Agency ... specifying the steps it will take to become
adequately capitalized and regulators must decide whether to approve the plan.").
175. See 12 U.S.C. 1831o (h) (3) (A) (explaining that the agencies have the
power to "appoint a receiver ... for the institution" if it is "critically
undercapitalized"); Carnell, Perverse Incentives, supra note 173, at 340 (" [T]hc agency
may approve a plan only upon finding that the plan rests on realistic
assumptions.... [ILack of an acceptable plan is itself grounds for conservatorship or
receivership.").
176. See Carnell, Pererse Incentives, supra note 173, at 425 (asserting that the
restrictions on capital distributions are a "catalyst for restoring capital"); see also supra
note 175 and accompanying text (discussing that a bank deemed non-viable will be
placed into receivership).
177. See supra notes 175-176 and accompanying text (explaining how the PCA
framework requires regulators to act). Basel III provides some tools that national
regulators can use to ensure compliance with capital requirements (e.g., limitations on
capital distributions for failing to meet the conservation bufer); see also supra notes
146-150 and accompanying text (explaining the conservation buffer). The US rules go
a step beyond this and not only limit a bank's ability to make distributions, but also
forces it to either recapitalize, or fail. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text
(explaining the PCA framework).
178. See Regulatory Capi Rules supr not 108, it 52824 "The proposed
transitiont provisionsi have been designed to erioe compl;,ance w;th the Dodd-Frank
Act. As a result, they could. in certain circumstancs. be more Stringent h.an the
ritl~iin4 arra1ngemnIIs pr oposed in BasC II.
179. See BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 94(a) ("National implementation by member
countries will begin on 1January 2013.").
180. See id. 1[ 94(b) ("On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the 4.5%
Common Equity Tier I and 6% Tier I requirements.").
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Buffer must be fully implemented by January 2019. 181
Instruments that no longer qualify as Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital
will be phased out over a ten-year period beginning in January
2013.182 The capital conservation buffer requirement takes effect
on January 1, 2016 and is gradually phased-in equally over a
three year period, increasing by .0625% per year to reach its
final level of 2.5% onJanuary 1, 2019.18
The US proposed rules, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, detail a
stricter schedule for phasing out non-qualifying capital securities
than Basel III for certain banks. '8 The proposed rules
incorporate the transition period mandated by Dodd-Frank to
banks having at least US$15 billion worth of assets. 185 Thus,
capital instruments issued before June 2010 by large banks that
no longer meet the requirements would be phased out from
2013-2016 instead of a ten-year period.' 86 For example, current
Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital that no longer meets the new Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital requirements by 2013 will begin being phased
181. See id. 133 ("The capital conservation buffer... [becomes] fully effective
on 1J anuary 2019.").
182. See id. 1 9 4(g) ("Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-common
equity Tier I capital or Tier 2 capital will be phased out beginning I January 2013 ....
[T]heir recognition will be capped at 90% fron 1 January 2013, with the cap reducing
by 10 percentage points in each subsequent year.").
183. See id. I 133 ("[The capital conservation buffer] will begin at 0.625% of
RWXAs [risk weighted assets] on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an
additional 0.625 percentage points, to reach its final leel of 2.5% of RWVAs on 1
january 2019.").
184. Compare 12 U.S.C. 5371(b) (4) (B) (2006) ("For debt or equity mstruments
issued before May 19, 2010 ... any regulatory capital deductions required under this
section shall be phased in incrementally over a period of 3 years, with the phase-in
period to begin on January 1, 2013 .... .") with Regulatory Capilai Rules. supra noe
105. 77 Fed. Reg. ai 169. 52848 (explaining that Basel III requires non-qualifying
capital instruments to be phased out over a ten-year "horizon"). See also Regulator
Capial Rules, supra note 105. 77 Fed. Reg. 41 169, 52830 eplainig hat Dodd Frank
In.'n'dateis a ihr ee-yCi phaIse-in schedukl for "deposiTory instiultion 1hoding cmpnies
W;1th total consolidated assets greater than or equal to [UjS]SI5 billion .... )
185. See Regulaoy Capial Rules. supra nowe 105, 77 Fed. Reg. i 169, 528- 0
(noting thi Dodd-Y.nk imposes a thrce-yce.ar phase-in schedule for "depository
institution hjolding comnpanies with total consiol;(dated assets greater than or equal to
[US]$15 billion .... Id, i 169, 52831 explaLiLninLg Ihi a "depositoy instiLution
holding company oif [USlS15 billion- Would begin phasing ouL incligible capital
sarting January 1, 2013 and would be allowed to incide "zero percent as of janua-y 1,
2016 a-nd Iihreaffter"
186. See supra, noe 184 and aimp111a)n yi1g ex (comp.aing th BsCe n iyear
has e-in p h 1the thhree-yea phase-;n period rn the proposed rules).
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out over three years.1 17 In 2016, the bank capital must achieve
the new standards.188 Banks that have less than USS15 billion in
assets, however, have until 2022 to meet the new standards. 89
This Part has given a brief overview of how the US proposed
rules compare to the standards articulated by Basel III. The US
rules mimic the Tier 1 Capital, Tier 2 Capital, conservation
buffer, and counter-cyclical buffer requirements set by Basel III.
The proposed rules differ, however, in their transitional
requirements for large banks. In addition, the rules incorporate
the new capital requirements into the existing PCA
requirements, which provide an enforcement mechanism not
articulated in Basel III. Part III of this Comment analyzes these
differences and similarities and makes recommendations.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE AEWREQUIREMENTS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Part III argues that the rules do not go far enough to
enhance banking soundness. Part III.A explains that the US
federal agencies do not always enforce the required capital levels
of banks. Part IIIB argues that even if the agencies were to
enforce the minimum capital requirements, there would not be
a substantial impact on the safeness and soundness of banks
because the requirements are set much too low and have been
easily met by the largest banks. Part III.C argues that the
minimum capital standards should be set much higher to reflect
the actual amounts of capital banks need to bolster market
confidence, and the PCA framework should be accordingly
revised to require banks to meet the higher levels of capital.
Unquestionably, the newest Accord enhances bank
soundness by issuing new capital requirements. 'o The US
proposed rules, however, simply copy many of the new
187. See id. i 52866. Table 9) (discussing the transition period).
188. See id. (discussing the transition period).
189. See id. a1 52831 (explaining that a bank "under [US]$15 billion... that
issued a tier 1 non-qualifying capital instrumlent in August 2010 would be able to count
90 percent of the ... instrument as of january 1, 2013 . . . [but] as of January 1, 2022,
no tier 1 non-qualifying capital instrument ,would be recognized as tier 1 capital.").
190. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (explaining that bank
regulation focuses on promoting the safety of bank through capital requirements).
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requirements. 191 The US rules rubber stamp the Basel
requirements rather than mandating stricter requirements
based on the amount of capital US banks are currently
holding. 1 Based on the actual amount of capital banks are
currently reporting in the United States, the proposed rules are
too lax. 19 The PCA requirements and overall capital ratio
should be increased to reflect the post crisis level of capital that
US banks have currently accumulated.
The proposed rules capture many aspects of Basel III and
should dampen the impact of future financial crises.14 Several
important measures, such as the counter-cyclical buffer, help to
bolster a bank's ability to absorb losses when a financial crisis
hits. 195 The restrictions on capital distributions and bonus
payments are a direct incentive for management to maintain the
required capital levels. '9 Also, Dodd-Frank mandates that banks
deduct unqualified instruments more quickly than Basel III,
making banks safer quicker.17
191. See, e.g., supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text (explaining how the
United States has proposed rules that closely track several parts of Basel 111).
192. See, e.g., supra note 191 and accompanying text (showing that several parts of
Basel III wvere identical to the proposed rules); BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 55 n.16
(explaining that each Country may implement higher ratios than those articulated by
Basel lll).
193. Compare supra notes 118 and accompanying text (explaining how the Basel
III rules mandate a 4.5% common equity requircment), with Peter Eavis, 15 of 19 Big
Banks Pass Fed's Latest Stress Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13. 2012,
http://wwv.nytimes.corn/2012/03/14/biisiness/jpmorgan-passes-stress-test-raises-
dividend.htnIl?_r0 (noting that the current lkvels of capital are higher than 4.5%). See
also Federal Reserve Stress Test, supra note 139, at 16 (noting that banks are currently
holding over 11% current tier I equity capital).
194. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting how some commentators
have "hailed" the agrectnent as an examplc of future international lawmaking); supra
notes 7-12 and accompanying text (explaining that increasing capital requirements
decreases potential losses to depositors).
195. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the countercyclical
buffer); supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text (explaining that increasing capital
requircments allows a bank to absorb potential losses).
196. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text (discussing the distribution
restrictions associated with a low conservation bufler).
197. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (explaining the transitional
differences mandated by Dodd-Frank); supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text
(explaining that higher quality capital is more likely to help depositors avoid losses).
Having less non-qualifying instrunmcnts makes banks safer because the new instruments
must conform to Basel III's higher quality capital. See supra notes 90-97 and
accompanying text (explaining how Basel III mandates higher quality capital).
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The new PCA framework also bolsters bank safety by
focusing on a specific component of capital, common equitx s
For example, unlike the previous accords, banks cannot keep
4% equity and 4% subordinated debt on their balance sheets
and still meet capital requirements because common equity
must now always be greater than 4.5%. 9 There is no denying
that the new framework is an improvement and is a step in the
right direction. 20 However, the requirements suffer from some
of the same problems as the previous accords and are a pale
shadow of what US banks should be mandated to implement.2o'
A. The United States Does Not Always Enforce Its Bank Capital
Requirements
Basel III introduces a new conservation buffer and counter-
cyclical buffer.2 The buffers, besides requiring more capital
than the previous accords, can limit a bank's ability to distribute
bonuses or dividend payments.203 The US proposed rules adopt
the buffers and their restrictions, but also go a step further by
aligning the common tier 1 equity ratio to the prompt corrective
action framework. 204 There are several reasons why this
framework will not offer much in the way of requiring US banks
to comply with capital requirements, which the buffers and
realignment are patently meant to do.
First, there is a history of a lack of capital level enforcement
in the United States.2oD A recent bank capital enforcement study
198. See supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text (articulating the benefits of
the PCA framework).
199. See Regulatory Capial Rules, supra note 105, a-t 169, 52810 (explaining that
the PCA framework was updated to require banks to always have at Icast 4.5% Common
Tier I Equity).
200. See supra note 54 and accompanying tcxt (noting how some commentators
have praised the Basel lawmaking process); supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text
(explaining that increasing capital requirements makes bank less likely to fail).
201. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (explaining that the minimum
capital requircncnts are set too low).
202. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text (discussing the new buffers).
203. See supra note 143-50 and accompanying tcxt (discussing the potential
rcstrictions on distributions when banks fail to meet the new buffers).
204. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text (explaining how the PCA
fi amework has been realigned).
205. See Julic Andersen Hill. Bank Capital Regulation By Enforcement: An Empirical
Stud, 87 IND. I.. 645, 648 (2012).
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concluded that "the data show a near-complete absence of
capital enforcement action issued to the largest banks."2o0 In
fact, the Federal Reserve "is less likely than other regulators to
bring serious capital enforcement actions and is less likely to
increase capital requirements."2o?
Therefore, to the extent that the Basel framework gives full
discretion to the implementing jurisdiction, the argument that
soft law is not "truly law" gains some credence. 08 In other words,
the new framework, like the other Accords, has an internal
weakness because it does not stipulate or decree how its
requirements should be enforced. 21 In the context of the
buffers, which restrict discretionary spending, the proposed
rules explicitly state that, "each agency would retain its authority
to permit a banking organization supervised by that agency to
make a capital distribution or a discretionary bonus payment."21o
This means that the agencies can selectively refuse to enforce
the buffer imposed restrictions. Although this gives the agencies
some leeway in how they enforce potentially costly bank capital
requirements, it also exposes depositors to the risk that banks
remain inadequately capitalized.211 Therefore, if the agencies fail
to enforce the standards, this would frustrate the Accords' goal
of fostering depositor confidence through the imposition of
meaningful bank capital requirements.22
Additionally, Dodd-Frank's resounding silence gives the US
federal regulators a wide breadth of discretion in establishing
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of "soft
law").
209. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing how the P(A
framework provides an enforcement mechanism that is not in Basel III); see also supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text (explaining that each member is responsible for
implementing the Basel agreement).
210. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text (discussing how failing to
meet the buffers can result in limits on discretionary distributions); Regulatory Capital
Ruless notc 105, 77 Fed. Reg. at 16n, 52804 same
211. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining how new capital
requirements impose certain costs on bank growth); supra notes 6-12 (explaining how
depositors are at risk when a bank is not adequately capitalized).
212. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying (explaining that capital
requirements are imposed in order to protect depositors).
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capital levels. 21 Dodd-Frank mandates a specific three-year
transition plan for non-qualifying instruments.214 The agencies
have no choice but to adopt this statutory mandate into the
proposed regulations. 2' The Act utterly fails, however, to
provide specific guidance on capital standards. Congress did not
delve into the minutia of capital requirements, instead requiring
only that the "appropriate" agency establish such standards.216
Consequently, the historical grant of complete discretion with
no method of enforcement is a major way in which the ultimate
effectiveness of the Accord can be undermined.
B. Banks Have Accumulated a Key Capital Component in Excess of the
Requirements
Furthermore, even if the agencies suddenly became ardent
defenders of capital standards and ruthlessly enforce them,
there is still reason to doubt that the new agreement's capital
levels do much to mitigate the effects of unexpected losses. Both
Basel III and the US proposed rules put a large emphasis on
increasing the Tier 1 Common Equity of banks.21 Although
both frameworks extol the virtues of focusing on common equity
as a tool to help depositors, they demand exceedingly little of
this component. ,
The focus on common equity is patently clear under Basel
III and the US rules.21 The new framework introduces a new
Tier 1 Common Equity requirement and two entirely new
buffers which are comprised exclusively of common equity.22o
Together, these new standards impose a 7% common equity
mandatory requirement on banks (4.5% of Tier 1 Common
213. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (noting that Dodd-Frank leaves
it to the regulators to establish capital level requirements).
214. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text (explaining how Dodd-Frank
imposes this transition).
215. See upra notes 185-89 and accompanying text (discussing how the agencies
adopted this transition changes as required by Dodd-Frank).
216. See supra note 104 (discussing how Dodd-Frank requires this).
217. See supra notes 41, 122-26 (explaining how this is a "key" aspect of regulatory
standards); see supra notes 126-29 (discussing how the United States focuses on this
component).
218. See id. (explaining how this is an important aspect of regulatory standards).
219. See supra notes 41 122-26 (noting the importance of common equity).
220. See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing how Basel III
establishes these requirements).
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Equity and 2.5% Conservation Buffer).221 Yet, current levels of
bank capital show this standard is not particularly imposing.222
The results of the Federal Reserve's most recent "stress
test," reports that, as of the end of the third quarter of 2012, the
largest banks maintain over a 11% ratio of Tier 1 common
equity to risk weighted assetsM" This easily surpasses the 4.5%
Tier 1 Equity requirement and even the overall 7% equity
required by Basel III and espoused by the US proposed rules.2" 4
Therefore, while the new standards emphasize the importance
of including common equity into banks' minimum capital levels,
they in fact necessitate relatively lax requirements225
The Common Tier 1 Equity requirement, unfortunately, is
not the only impotent feature of the new standards. Basel III,
like Basel II, keeps the overall risk weighted asset ratio at 8%,
complex global financial developments notwithstanding.226 The
new agreement and the US proposed rules do, however, include
a conservation buffer and a counter-cyclical buffer. 22 This
means that a bank may be required to carry at least 13% of
capital to risk weighted assets (8% overall capital ratio plus 5%
buffers). However, the latest study shows that the largest banks
in the United States have already surpassed this capital level.22
The overall capital ratio for these banks in the third quarter of
221. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (explaining how the standards
require 7%).
222. See FEDERAL RESERVE STRESS TEST, supra note 139, at 16 (displaying a table
which notes the lkvels of bank capital).
223. See id. (displaying a table which notes the levels of bank capital); see Eavis,
supra note 193 ("One measure of capital for the banks, which currently stands at 10.1
percent of assets . . . .").
224. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the Basel III common
equity tier 1 requirement of 4.5%); RegIamr Capital Ruks, supra n1ote 108, at 52810
(explaining that the PCA framework was updated to require banks to always have at
least 4.5% Common Tier I Equity).
225. See supra notes 217-24 (explaining that the new standards focus on common
equity ); supra note 223 (noting how banks have already met this requirement).
226. See supra note 136 (explaining how Basel III also mandates the same ratio).
227. See supra notes 146-56 and accompanying text (discussing these buffers).
228. See supra note 223 (noting that the current bank capital levels for the tested
banks exceed this requirement).
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2012 was over 15%, even higher than all the buffers and
minimum capital ratios combined.229
When evaluated under the new requirements, the latest
stress test shows that banks are easily able to meet the new
requirements and surpass them.2so It also means that the new
standards, which are supposed to ensure the safety and
soundness of banks, are much less rigorous than even what
banks currently impose upon themselves. 2 In times of easy
access to credit, therefore, it is foreseeable that the new
requirements may cause the current bank capital levels to
decrease to meet the requirements, thus undermining the intent
of the heightened ratio.
C. The Alinimum Requirements Should Be Set to Those Levels WA7iich
Bolster Bank Confidence
The fundamental objective of the capital requirement
framework is to protect depositors and avoid bank failure. 32
Bank runs occur when depositors lose confidence in the
longevity of a bank.2 MB It would make sense, therefore, to require
levels of minimum capital standards that assure depositors that a
bank can endure sudden losses. In other words, regulations
should require banks to hold enough capital so that the vast
majority of depositors will not question the viability of a given
bank.
Historically, right after a financial crisis, confidence in
banks is at its lowest point.234 Therefore, banks must remain
229. See EDERAL RESERVE STRESS TEST, supra note 139, at 16 (displaying a table
which notes the banks' capital levels). The proposed rules require 13% if all the buffers
and ratios are required. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
230 . See supra note 217-24(explaining that Basel III introduces new
requirements); supra note 225 (noting how banks have alrcady met the conmon equity
requirements).
231. Compare supra note 143 (explaining that the new requirements requires a 7%
common equity ratio), with supra note 225 and accompanying text (explaining that
banks currently have over a 10% common equity ratio).
232. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of
capital requirements).
233. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text (explaining bank runs).
234. See Una Okonkwo Osili et al., Bank Crisis and Investor Confidenc, CTR. FOR
ECON. STUDIS, No. 09-02 (2009) ("Decreased confidence in the banking sector can
prolong recovery following a crisis and reduce the perceived credibility of post-crisis
reforms."); Felix Rioja et al., The Long Run EfJets oj Banking Crisis on Investmtent,
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adequately capitalized to stay competitive in the market and
bolster confidence.235 That is, even without regulations, the
market requires a certain amount of capital.2" The 2013 Federal
Reserve Stress Test study is an indicator of what the market
requires when investor confidence is low after a crisis.217 This
can be seen as the real, market-based minimum capital
requirement for banks to function in the market place. 38
Therefore, prompt corrective action would be most
effective at these levels, where investor confidence is likely to be
low enough to threaten the bank's viability. If depositors do not
trust the stability of a bank due to its low amounts of capital, the
bank may suffer a bank run and fail.2" The proposed rules
mandate that federal agencies enforce the capital requirements
when Tier 1 equity falls below 4.5%.20o
This is too little too late. By the end of 2008, when many
banks were on the brink of failure, banks had Tier 1 Common
ANDRLW YOUNG SCHOOL OF POLY STUDIES, GA. STATE UNIV., Mar. 2011. at 2
("ConHidence in the banking system can erode with repeated crisis of when the effects
are widespread with a counltry for example, causing losses on deposits or extensive
bank closures."); see, e.g., Gogoi, supra note 6 (reporting that a of
cnIdec 1,1n(,) the financia syste" lead theW Us goenmnlo inject[ "billions" of
1edlars"-intOte finanicialsyem
235. See Elliot, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining how the banks had to increase their
capital in order to meet investor perceptions of capital adequacy); Tarbert, supra note
24, at 773 (explaining that the threat of banks runs encourages "banks to maintain
sufficient capital, commensurate with their portfolio risk, to ensure the continued
confidence of depositors, thereby avoiding a run on the bank that might put it out of
business).
236. See Elliot, supra note 10. at 6 (" [A]t the turn of 2009 some of the big banks
found that investors were deeply concerned about the level of their tangible common
equity as a percentage of total assets. Banks could not afford to ignore this perception,
even though it was not the primary focus of either regulators or rating agencies, so they
took steps to enhance their tangible common equity ratios."); Tarbert, supra note 24, at
773 ("Many economists and legal scholars believe that the market alone, not the
government, should regulate bank capital.").
237. See Elliot, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining how the banks had to increase their
"tangible common cquity as a percentage of total assets" in order to meet investor
perceptions of capital adequacy).
238. See generally FEDERAL RESERVE STRESS TEST, supra note 139(noting the
current amount of capital banks carry); see also Tarber, supra note 24, at 773 ("Many
economists and lkgal scholars believe that the market alone, and the government,
should regulate bank capital" [insert period]).
239. See supra notes 3-6 (explaining how a bank run occurs).
240. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the PCA
framework).
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equity ratios of just over 5 %. 24 1 The new PCA framework only
begins to work when, as the financial crisis has shown, a bank
may already be dangerously close to failure.24 2 Therefore, the
PCA framework should be set at levels improve a bank's
soundness before depositors have already lost faith. It should
require at least 11% of Tier 1 common equity to be "adequately
capitalized" because the banks have determined that such levels
are what the market requires to bolster confidence after a
crisis.243
Similarly, the minimum overall Basel capital ratio should be
raised to at least 14.5%.244 As explained above, the Tier 1 Equity
requirement should be increased to the current bank capital
levels (i.e., 11% Common Tier 1 Equity).245 If the Tier 1
common equity requirement were raised, this would increase
the overall Tier 1 Ratio to 12 .5 %.2465 Tier 2 Capital would still be
2%, meaning that the overall ratio would be 14.5%.247 This
requirement would be separate from the conservation buffer of
2.5%.248 In other words, using current bank capital levels as a
standard would require a bank to have 11% Tier 1 Common
Equity and still maintain its separate 2.5% conservation buffer
comprised of common equity, which is an overall total of 13 .5 %
241. See FEDLRAL RLSLRL STRESS TEST, supra note 139, at 2 (displaying a graph
showing these capital levels).
242. See supra notes 164-74 (explaining that the agencies only act when a bank is
not at least "adequately capitalized").
243. See supra note 237-40 (explaining that when investor confidence is low,
banks obtain capital levels necessary to bolster investor confidence).
244. See FLDERAL RLSLRVL STRESS TEST, supra note 139, at 16 (noting that the
current overall capital levels are approximately 16%).
245. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text (explaining that bank capital
levels should be set to the level apparently required by the market).
246. See supra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (explaining that bank levels
should be raised to the current capital levels). If the Tier 1 Comnmon equity were to be
raised to 11% (instead of 4.5%), this would increase overall Tier 1 Capital to 12.5%
(instead of 6%). See supra note 118 (explaining that Basel III requires a 4.5% ratio);
BASEL III, supra note 18, 1 50 (explaining that Basel III also allows "Additional Tier I
capital" for a total ratio of 6%).
247. See supra note 246 (explaining how my proposal would result in a Tier I
Capital ratio of 12.5%): supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining that Basel
III allows Tier 2 Capital, bringing the overall (Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital) to 8% of risk
weighted assets).
248. See BASEL III, supra note 18. 1 129 n.47 (explaining that common equity can
only be used for the conservation buffer once it has been used to fully satis4 Tier 1
Common Equity ratio).
US RULES BASED ON BASEL III
common equity. Requiring these amounts would be much more
likely to secure financial stability for banks because these levels
are more likely to assure depositors that a bank will not fail.24 9
The requirements this Comment proposes are significantly
higher than those contained in the proposed US rules, but given
the extended transition period (i.e., the requirements won't be
fully in effect until 2019), higher ratios would be a much more
meaningful step towards mitigating financial crises. 250
Additionally, these ratios would not be the most stringent
worldwide. Switzerland's proposed rules, for example, provide
for ratios ranging from 19% to 26% for certain banks.25 ' The
requirements recommended here are based on what banks have
demonstrably been able to obtain in the United States while still
achieving growth and fostering a growing economy. 25 2 And these
higher levels are keyed to what the market perceives are safe
levels after a financial crisis, so they are precisely designed to
maintain confidence in the banking system. 2 If the
requirements were raised to the levels this Comment suggests,
they would meaningfully enhance the US banking regulatory
framework and benefit the financial system.
CON\CL USION
The current Basel agreement and proposed rules are a step
in the right direction. They increase the total amount of capital
banks should carry and are aligned with the US's PCA
framework to bolster enforcement. The Basel Agreements
suffer, however, from the historical problem of the lack of an
international method of enforcement. Similarly, the proposed
249. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text (explaining how increasing
capital requirements beneits depositors).
250. See id. and accompanying text (explaining how bank capital helps prevent
bank failures).
251. See Katharina Bart, Swiss Banks Cy Foul Over Capital Rales, WALL ST. J., May
13, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038642045763
20792058038706.htnil (explaining that the kgislature is proposing ratios in this range).
252. See FEDERAL. RESERVE STRESS TEST, supra note 139, at 16 (disclosing the
amount of capital banks currently hold); James Politi, US Economi Grows at Faster Rate of
3.1%, FI N. TIMES, December 20, 2012, available at http://www,.ft.comi/cs/s/0/
al5l8516-4aac-Ile2-968a-00144feab49a.html (explaining how the United States has
grown the most since 2011).
253. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text (explaining how the market
requires a certain amount of capital).
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rules are subject to lack of domestic enforcement. Additionally,
they actual set capital requirement levels much too low as an
empirical matter, as determined by the current level of capital
that banks hold. This Comment lays out the Accords and the
most crucial parts of the proposed rules, and argues that,
although helpful, the new minimums are a pale shadow of what
needs to be required in order to have a meaningful impact on
depositor safety.
NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS
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